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ÎREPACB

Most schools of historic interpretation agree that
Theobald Theodor von Bethmann Hollweg, fifth Chancellor of
the German Empire, stood for a short time at the focus of
European history;

his encouragement of Austria-Hungary

early in July 1914 was the most important turning point in
the crisis precipitated by the murder at Sarajevo.

The his-»

tory of the progressive involvement of European nations
following Germany's support of Austria-Hungary has been re
lated often enough,

^uite the opposite is true of Bethmann

Hollweg's earlier diplomacy.

Very little attention has been

given to the foreign policy of the man at the center of that
fateful series of events, although for five years preceding
it, he had directed a consistent and conciliatory policy for
the German Empire.

The nature of his choice in the final

crisis, the reason for his decision, cannot be fully under
stood without an examination of the man's foreign policy from
his accession to the office of Chancellor in 1909 to the end
of 1913.

Since it was his main endeavor to bring about a

change in Anglo-German relations, it is most fruitful to con
centrate a limited study on his direction of German policy to
ward Great Britain during the period in question.
This study is organized around four specific events or
crises in Anglo-German relations:

Bethmann Hollweg's first

ill
efforts at a reconciliation with Great Britain, the 1911
Morocco crisis, Lord Haldane’s mission to Berlin in 1912, and
the Balkan Wars.

Each of the four chapters seeks to ascertain

the effect of one event or crisis on the diplomatic situation
between the two countries.

An introduction briefly examines

Bethmann Hollweg's background and early career, his personal
relationship with the Emperor, the constitutional position of
a Chancellor in the German Empire, and the general European
situation on his accession to the position of Chancellor.
Nearly all of the material is taken from two primary
sources, the series of German Foreign Office documents,
Die grosse Politik der europaeischen Kabinette 1870-1914,
and the published British Foreign Office papers, British
Documents on the Origins of the War 1898-1914. Work on
this study was greatly facilitated by the fact that both
series are topically arranged.

Volumes XXVIII to XXXV of

the 40-volume German publication covered the topics under
consideration, though other volumes were used for occasional
reference.

The profusion of editorial comment in these

volumes often led to other pertinent sources, particularly
to biographical works.

All translations from the German in

these and other documents were made directly from the original
Volumes VI, VII, and IX of the British documents contains
material on the same topics.

Volumes VI and VII deals speci

fically with the Anglo-German tensions, while the two-part

iv
volume IX deals with the origins and conduct of the Balkan
Wars.

Other volumes of the series were used for occasional

reference.
A number of sources contain some primary material on
narrower aspects of the topic.

Ernst Jaeckh's biographical

study, Kiderlen-Waechter der Staatsmann und Mensch, reveal
details of Bethmann Hollweg’s relationship to his Foreign
Office.

Admiral von Tirpitz's apologetic Politische Bokumente

give a detailed, if somewhat biased, account of the Navy’s
persistent opposition to the Chancellor's policy toward Great
Britain.

Of a number of important biographical and autobio

graphical sources, the most useful were Bethmann Hollweg's
Reflections on the World War, Sir Edward Grey's Twenty-Five
Years 1892-1916, and Erich Eyck's Das persoenliche Regiment
Wilhelms II.
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INÎROIXJCTION

It is fitting to use Bethmann*s own words to summarize
the diplomatic situation which faced him when he became
Chancellor in 1909.

The previous Chancellor, Bernhard von

Buelow, later gave a very optimistic summary of that situa
tion, describing it as the most favourable since the days of
Bismarck.

In a conversation with the Austrian Foreign

Minister Alois Graf Aerenthal in 1909, Bethmann himself
agreed with this summary in general terms.

1

He admitted

...that he was unfamiliar with the complicated gearwork
of foreign policy, that it would cost him much effort to
become familiar with this department. His main endeavour
would be to obtain goodwill abroad and to reduce as much
as possible the many areas of friction in Germany's inter
national relations. In this sphere, Prince Buelow had
left him a well-managed heritage, a fact which would make
his task significantly easier.
After the war, however, he made a totally different
estimate of Beulow's heritage.

It is reproduced here at

length because it represents a remarkably objective analysis
2
of Germany's diplomatic situation:
In the year 1909, the situation which I am broadly

^Ludwig Bittner, Hans Uebersberger, Oesterreich-Ungams
Aussenpolitik von der bosnischen Krise 1§ôë bis zum krlegsausSrucE feljtT'TVien. 1 9 % ) 'ÏT. # % ' l on.
■■■flëri"aftfr--cited as O. U. A .) Report by Aerenthal.
^Th. von Bethmann Hollweg, Reflections on the World War.
Before the War. (London, 1919) Ï,

attempting to describe here was based on the fact that
England had firmly taken its stand on the side of France
and Russia in pursuit of its traditional policy of
opposing whatever Continental Power for the time being
was the strongest; and that Germany held fast to its
naval programme, had given a definite direction to its
Eastern policy, and had, moreover, to guard against a
French antagonism that had in no wise been mitigated by
its policy in later years. And if Germany saw a formid
able aggravation of all the aggressive tendencies of
Franco-Eussian policy in England's pronounced friend
ship with this Dual Alliance, England on its side had
grown to see a menace in the strengthening of the German
fleet and a violation of its ancient rights in our
Eastern policy. Words had already passed on both sides.
The atmosphere was chilly and clouded with distrust.
Under these conditions the position ofGermany was
all the more precarious, seeing that the Triple Alliance
had lost much of its internal solidarity, even if exter
nally it seemed still to hold good. Thiswas not so,
however, as between us and Austria-Hungary, where the
closest understanding prevailed....But Italy, after
coming to an understanding with the Western Powers over
Morocco and Tripoli..., was more and more clearly draw
ing closer to France....Besides, preoccupations with its
interests in the Mediterranean obliged Italy to look to
England; to say nothing of the formidable prospect with
which it was faced in the case of hostilities with
England as its insular position put it quite at the
mercy of the English fleet. The attitude of Italy at
the Algeciras Conference and during the Bosnian crisis
was sufficiently suggestive of the real state of the
case. Its flirtations with the Entente had led to
dangerous intimacies.
The external situation in the summer of 1909 may
then be impartially summed up as follows : England,
France and Russia were associated in close coalition....
The grave controversies of earlier times between England
and France or England and Russia had been got rid of by
agreements from which each party had received material
advantages. Italy, whose Mediterranean interests had
brought differences between it and the Western Powers
but had also brought it into dependence on them, had
been steadily drawing closer to their group. The cement
that bound the whole structure of the coalition together
was the community of interest, of do ut des, and by the
conflict of each separate Power with %rmany.
This analysis should by no means be dismissed as "wisdom
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after the fact,” for Bethmann*s entire foreign policy was
clearly based on it.

The Leitmotif of the passage repro

duced above is insecurity.

This insecurity was characteris

tic of Bethmann the diplomat, and in the summer of 1914 it
determined the nature of his decision.
To understand the foreign policy of the fifth Chancellor
of the German Empire, a knowledge of his constitutional
position is essential.

Theoretically, Germany was a federa

tion of a number of states, which all retained a substantial
degree of sovereignty.

This fact was reflected in the

structure of the Imperial Parliament, which consisted of
the Bundesrat, an upper house composed of delegates appoint
ed by the federal states, and the Reichstag, elected by un
iversal manhood suffrage.

This lower house had a very

limited right to initiate legislation, but derived its
considerable power from the right to grant or refuse approval
of all laws, including the budget.

Thus it had, in theory,

the leverage to increase its powers at the expense of the
executive, though it displayed very little desire to do so;
it seemed curiously devoid of a "will to power."
The state of Prussia had a preponderance in the limited
area of Imperial jurisdiction, both through the number of
its members in the Bundesrat (three more than required for
veto of any constitutional change) and through the fact
that the Emperor was also King of Prussia, while his Imperial

4.
Chancellor was simultaneously President of the Prussian
Council of Ministers.

This Prussian preponderance in the

Empire is not surprising, since that state contained roughly
two-thirds of the land area and population of Germany.
Moreover, Prussia had clearly borne the burden of German
unification.
Because of these constitutional peculiarities, the
position of the Chancellor was an extremely difficult one.
He had to concern himself with parliamentary majorities
almost as much as the Prime Minister in Great Britain,
because of the Reichstag's powers of financial obstruction.
Since he was responsible not to the Reichstag which he
manipulated, but to the Bnperor, he had to reconcile the
Emperor's wishes with Reichstag possibilities.

This was

never easy, but in the twentieth century, the shift to the
left in popular politics rendered it increasingly difficult.
The growth of the Social Democratic party indicated well
enough that many Germans could no longer be reconciled
with the Imperial prerogative on any terms.
The overlapping of the Prussian and Imperial administra
tions added to the difficulties.

In contrast to Imperial

Secretaries of State, the Prussian Ministers had direct

In the Reichstag elections of 1912, the Social Democrats
became the strongest single party; they had received ap
proximately one-third of the total vote.

5.
access to, and therefore great influence on the Emperor.
Their influence was for the moat part a solidly conservative
one, in direct contradiction to popular political trends.
In a recent study of Bethmann's domestic politics, H. G.
Snarzlik concluded that the position of Chancellor required
great mediating talents in view of this basic schism in the
Empire’s political structure, and that Bethmann possessed
such talents to a high degree.

4.

In his opinion, Bethmann

realized that only a strengthening of the position of
Chancellor could salvage the system, and that he achieved
such a strengthening at the right time.
In foreign affairs, the Chancellor had the constitu
tional task of implementing the Emperor’s foreign policy.
His own acquiescence in that policy was morally required,
and to a man of Bethmann’s nature such moral considerations
were of great consequence.

He certainly considered him

self to be personally responsible for the foreign policy of
Germany.

The Imperial constitution made the conduct of a

unified foreign policy excessively difficult.

The Depart

ment of Foreign Affairs, under an Imperial State Secretary,
had no immediate access to the Emperor, but was responsible
to the Chancellor, whose task it was to defend the department’s

^H. G. Zmarzlik, Bethmann Hollweg als Reichskanzler
1909-1914. (Duesseldorî,' l95'7) pp. $-25.
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policy.

However, numerous other officials with interests in

and influences on foreign affairs did have direct access to
the Bnperor,

These included all Prussian Ministers, three

top navy executives, three top army executives, in addition
to commanding Generals and Fleet Admirals.

The policy these

persons advocated was seldom that approved by the Foreign
Office.

While they bickered with each other, the military

gentlemen tended to unite against the "mere civilians" of
the Foreign Office, who were represented by the one voice of
the Chancellor,
In the most extreme condition, this situation permitted
the navy to conduct its own foreign policy, complete with
publicity organs superior to those of the Foreign Office,
and with a network of its own Ambassadors in the persons of
Naval Attaches to the Embassies.

These Attaches prepared

political reports independent of, and often at variance with,
those of the Ambassadors.

They sent these reports directly

to their military superiors who, as noted, had direct access
to the Emperor.

The German Enperor retained

ameasure of

real sovereignty only in his administration of the armed
forces.

Under cover of that complete administrative sover

eignty was conducted a second German foreign policy over
which the Chancellor had virtually no control.
a constitutional

anomaly of great importance

cellor's conduct

of foreign policy.

This was
for the Chan
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Was Bethmann Hollweg suited by temperament and experience
for this position, which the great Bismarck had described as
requiring more talent and energy than he himself possessed?
We must put out of mind the picture of the Bismarckian
Chancellor, for Bethmann possessed an entirely different
sort of qualification, which was in itself not unsuited to
the position.

In 1879» after a distinguished school career,

Bethmann entered government service at the age of twentythree, in the position of District Magistrate.

He advanced

very rapidly in the Prussian administration, serving from
1899 to 1905 as President of Mark Brandenburg,

He attained

cabinet rank in 1905 as the Prussian Minister of the Inter
ior.

In 1907, he entered the Imperial administration as

Secretary of State for the Interior, while retaining a
position in the Prussian administration as Vice-Chancellor,
That he was a brilliant and conscientious administrator is
granted even by his predecessor, von Buelow, who was not
inclined to flatter him.
A contemporary German historian describes him typically
as a thinker of great power and depth, very dependable,
but handicapped by a certain ponderousness, a predilection
for brooding, a lack of flair or of ability to inspire.^

^W. Prauendienst, Bethmann Hollweg, Neue deutsche
Biographie, (Berlin, 1955) II, pp. 188-93, Johannes
Siehler, IDeutsohe Geschichtc. (Berlin, I960) VI, p. 314.
^J. Buehler, Geschichte, VI, pp. 314-16.
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Other descriptions corroborate this picture, particularly
on the qualities of seriousness and integrity.

He was in

every respect the opposite of Prince von Buelow, who had
earned the nickname "the eel".
little military background ;

Significantly, Bethmann had

the noble title was of compar

atively recent origin, and his family was traditionally
7

devoted to banking, not soldiering.

He was not a Junker,

and his rapport with that class and with military officers
on the whole remained poor even after the Emperor bestowed
upon him the rank of Major General.

In a Prussian General's

uniform, he still looked the bemused philosopher.
Of necessity, Bethmann's political strength lay in his
personal relationship with the Enperor.

Unlike Buelow, he

could not be his friend and boon companion, because their
personalities were in almost every respect antithetical.
William II was a man of quick, broad but shallow intellect,
a man who cultivated the positiveness and sharpness of the
military officer.

Not only was the philosophic Bethmann

unsuited by temperament for contact with his monarch on a
social plane, but he lacked also the military background and
bearing which William II prized in his intimates.
hold on the Etaperor was twofold:

Bethmann's

his flawless reputation

abroad as a man of sincerity and goodwill was of consider-

^P. Haselmayr, Biplomatische Geschichte des zweiten
Reichs von 1871-1918. IMünchen ^ 1963") VI, ii, p. 14.
”
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able benefit in diplomacy, and did much to offset the
Etaperor's less enviable reputation.

More important, William

II found his uncompromising devotion to the monarchy a
pleasant change after Chancellor Buelow*s failure to defend
him from Reichstag criticism.

This, the Etaperor correctly

assumed, would not happen with Bethmann.
While the letter's loyalty found frequent and enthusias
tic expression, it was not the loyalty of a sycophant.
Bethmann's devotion was not to William II personally, but
to the Hohenzollem monarchy, to the principle of royalty.
His was the proud, arrogant loyalty which is supposedly
found in the best of that ancient nobility to which he did
not belong.

At times, Bethmann must have been consciously

protecting the principle of monarchy from the aberrations
of the individual monarch.

He sought, by means of intrigue

and discreet circumvention, to control the Emperor's sudden
interventions in diplomacy, in a manner designed to prevent
damage to the image of the Etaperor.

Throughout his career,

the fifth Chancellor treated William II's startling directives
as if they were merely theoretical speculations, not designed
for immediate implementation.

Only in this manner could he

achieve a semblance of continuity in his policies.
This is not to say that Bethmann always avoided taking
a strong position directly in opposition to the Etaperor.
fact, William II, who was somewhat given to thoughtless

In
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sarcasms, occasionally had to retreat in the face of his
Chancellor's indignant defence.

While it was not Bethmann's

policy to use the threat of resignation as a lever, he made
it quite clear that any attempt to circumvent his constitutional authority would bring about his departure.

8

ITor did

his devotion to the Hohenzollem monarchy prevent him from
censuring any political interference on the part of the
Royal Family.

The Crown Prince, who was on more than one

occasion the recipient of an official reprimand from the
Chancellor, repaid this attention with an enduring hatred
and constant intrigues against Bethmann.
From the Emperor's standpoint, Bethmann was in many
respects a most uncomfortable Chancellor;

this is one

reason why he was not altogether unsuited for the position.
Because of the constitutional peculiarities of the German
Empire, the Chancellor had to be a person talented in
mediation, who could correlate and reconcile the different
branches of the government.
ed to a high degree.

These talents Bethmann possess

That he was at crucial times lacking

in firmness appears tragic in retrospect only.

It must

be remembered that he saw as his diplomatic task the im
provement of Germany's position and security in the world,
not the prevention of the World War.

He did not have the

Q

The best example of this is cited in connection with
the Morocco crisis of 191I.
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advantage of hindsight which today makes some of his actions
seem tragically weak.
Through the Versailles War Guilt clause and through
less than objective analyses of history prompted by the
two world wars, Wilhelmine Germany has acquired the reputa
tion of a saber-rattling Junker-dominated upstart among
nations.

The years between the wars and the years after

the last war have not entirely erased this reputation.

The

fact that this man, who was centrally concerned with Germany's
original "aberration," fits so poorly into the picture as a
leader of such a country, makes him an object worthy of the
closest examination.

CHAPTER

I

BETHMAM'S FIRST APPROACH TO GREAT BRITAIN
Bethmann Hollweg*s efforts to achieve an understanding
with Great Britain were not the first such efforts made
on behalf of Germany;

nor was his approach a new one.

The

two most immediate antecedents of this direction in German
diplomacy were Buelow’s last attempts to achieve a similar
understanding, and Alfred von Kiderlen-Vaechter's conversa
tions on the subject with British Ambassador Sir Edward
Goschen when the former was temporary Foreign Affairs Secre
tary in the Buelow cabinet.

Bethmann benefited directly from

Buelow’s experience, since, as an important member of the
cabinet, he was informed of the major aspects of diplomacy.
Kiderlen’s experience became available when Bethmann in the
autumn of 1909, requested his advice on a proposed approach
to Great Britain, and later when, at Bethmann's insistence,
Kiderlen again became Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
In the autumn of 1908, following the Emperor's humilia
tion through the public outcry at his indiscreet Daily
Telegraph interview, Buelow again considered the question of
Anglo-German rivalry.

The diplomatic actions arising out of

this must have been very instructive for Bethmann;

they

clearly revealed the strengths and weaknesses of the Chan
cellor's constitutional position in Imperial Germany.

13.
Among higher officials in Germany, there existed two welldefined points of view on the subject of the Anglo-German
discord and its solution.

The diplomatic viewpoint, which

Chancellor Buelow adopted at this time, considered the
rivalry from the standpoint of Great Britain’s key position
in the European "alliance” system.

The strategic viewpoint,

as defended by Admiral von Tirpitz, the Secretary of State
for the navy, considered the military problems in the even
tuality of an Anglo-German war.

The former sought to reduce

Anglo-German animosity by reducing British suspicions of
Germany's naval expansion.

The latter sought to insure

peace by constructing a naval power position which would
deter British aggression, and would eventually force British
cooperation— or even friendship.
Buelow began his efforts with an attempt to reduce the
stubborn resistance of the Navy Secretary.

He had to con

vince him of the importance of the naval rivalry in produc
ing the Anglo-German discord, for this was the point at
which Buelow saw an opportunity for an easing of the tension.
To this end, he forwarded to Tirpitz Ambassador Paul Graf
von Wolff-Mettemich’s reports from England, which placed
great emphasis on the naval rivalry.^

Tirpitz, however,

i

Johannes Lepsius, A. M. Bartholdy, Friedrich Thimme,
eds. Die grosse Politik der europaischen Kabinette 1871-1914
(Berlin: 1951) 3QCVIII, #10227, pp. 5-6l (Hereafter cited as
D. G. P.)
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rejected this interpretation, placing emphasis rather on the
trade rivalry and on the supposedly deliberate exaggerations
P
of British party politics.
late in November 1908, Buelow
changed his tactics;

he asked Tirpitz whether he could give

assurances that the German navy could in the near future
meet the British navy in battle with a fair chance of success.^
Tirpitz had to admit that this was not to be expected.^

How

ever, he hastened to add his interpretation of this fact,
which differed radically from that of Mettemich.

The chances

of war with Thgland could be reduced, he said, not by a
naval agreement, but by an increase in the German navy.
Germany should pass as quickly as possible through a "danger
period," during which British animosity would naturally be
quite high.
period."

At present, Germany was still in the "danger

He proposed to get her through it by a substan

tial naval increase.
Despite this negative reply, Buelow acquainted Tirpitz
with his plan for an Anglo-German détente.^

He proposed

a concentration on coastal defences and on submarines, and
a twenty-five percent slowdown in the construction of capital

Zibid.,

XXVIII, #10227, pp. 5-6.

3lbid.,

XXVIII, #10235, pp. 21-23.

4lbid..

XXVIII, #10238, pp. 26-28.

5lbid..

XXVIII, #10242, pp. 38-40.

15.
ships.

This procedure would reduce British animosity, what

ever its origin, and would help Germany to pass through this
so-called "danger period" without war.^
Tirpitz took two weeks to answer;

during this time,

anzious queries attested to the nervous anticipation of the
German Foreign Office.

Finally, on January 4, 1909, Tirpitz

answered with an eminently reasonable document which, how
ever, made no concession to the Chancellor's viewpoint
The planned slowdown, he maintained, could only be inter
preted as a German collapse under British pressure.

The

effect on the German diplomatic position would be disastrous
in the long run.

Furthermore, could such a slight postpone

ment really remove British anxiety?

Or would it merely

weaken Germany's power position without bringing any benefit?
The best prospect for peace, he argued, lay in a continua
tion of the legally-established tempo of naval construction.

^E. L. Woodward pounced on the fact that, in this series
of exchanges, Buelow used the term "danger period." Woodward
interpreted this as a sign that Buelow also had in mind only
a temporary understanding for the time period of the German
navy's weg&ness. He implied that, following that time period,
the understanding would be superfluous. E. L. Woodward,
Great Britain and the German Navy (Oxford, 1934) p. 263.
ithis interpretation is open io" grave doubt. It is far more
likely that Buelow only adopted the strategic point of view
in order to convince the Admiral, who was more amenable to
such arguments. Moreover, both Tirpitz's and Buelow's use
of the term is not so much indicative of a German utilitar
ian attitude towards treaties and understandings, as it is
of a deep German mistrust of England.
'^D. G. P.. XXVIII, #10247, p. 51.
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not in an appeasement of the British, which could only lead
to more extreme demands on their part.
This difference of opinion proved to be permanent,
Buelow again pointed out the broader diplomatic consequences
of the naval rivalry, but Tirpitz insisted that a mutual
reduction which maintained the "two-power standard" was
O
absolutely unacceptable.
Instead, he advocated a ratio
of three-to-four which, in his opinion, provided a measure
9
of security for both nations.
Buelow and Mettemich
greeted this proposal with unconcealed impatience.

Met

t emich advised the Admiral not to propose the three-to-four
ratio unless he was ready for a war with Great Britain in
10
the near future.
Buelow now called a conference, in which the most
important military and civilian officials defended their
ii
views.
According to the Chancellor, the purpose of the
meeting was to decide if the three-to-four ratio proposed
by Tirpitz constituted a valid basis for negotiations with

Gibid., XXVIII, #10254, pp. 67-69.
9lbid., XXVIII, #10254, 10257, pp. 67-69, 78-79.
by Buelow.

, XXVHÎ, #10257, p p . 78-79, marginal notation
XXVIII, #10258, p. 80.

I^Ibid., XXVIII, #10306, pp. 168-178. Present were
Buelow, Bethmann Hollweg, Tirpitz, Moltke, Admiral Mueller,
Wolff-Mettemich, Schoen.

17.
Great Britain.

Buelow, Mettemich, the Foreign Affairs

Secretary Wilhelm von Schoen, Bethmann and Colonel-General
Helmuth von Moltke, Chief of the General Staff, defended
the position that an understanding with Britain must be
achieved, even at the cost of a slowdown of ship construc
tion,

They rejected the three-to-four ratio as a basis for

negotiations.

Tirpitz, though virtually unsupported, clung

to his original position on all points.

This conference of

June 3 illustrated the fact that the Imperial Navy had
developed for itself a role which the civilian leaders of
the Empire could in no way harmonize with their general
policy.

Moreover, it appeared that the navy had determined

to modify that general policy to fit its conception of the
navy's role, rather than accept a modification itself.
The record of this meeting has the additional importance
that it outlined Bethmann*s viewpoint on the subject before
he became Chancellor.

To make possible a German initiative,

a definite proposal was needed, but the ratio proposed by
the Admiral was not a suitable one.

Perhaps a colonial

agreement might provide the answer;

but, of course, the

present British tariff position made that difficult.
Could not the rate of shipbuilding be retarded, or the Navy
Law be modified?

The navy was obviously the key:

what

could the navy offer if renewed efforts at a détente were
made?

Evidently, Bethmann thoroughly understood the situa-

18.
tion, and it appears that his initial lack of familiarity
with diplomacy was not as crucial a factor as it is often
made out to be.

Perhaps in matters of diplomatic form he

had much to learn, but, while this would have disqualified
him for a consular position, it was scarcely a crucial
12
defect in a Chancellor.
During this internal power struggle in Germany, nego
tiations took place in a rather informal manner between
Kiderlen-Waechter, then temporary Foreign Affairs Secretary,
and the British Ambassador, Sir Edward Goschen.

Kiderlen

proposed a political understanding based on mutual promises
13
of non-aggression and neutrality in the event of war.
This approach had only one positive result:

it provided a

quick and unofficial lesson on British attitudes in the
question, which were fixed on limitation or reduction of
German naval armament and on preservation of the Entente.
It is unlikely that Bethmann knew of this attempt before he
became Chancellor, but he secured the benefit of the lesson
by involving Kiderlen in his own attempt to obtain an

12
Woodward illustrated his point that the Chancellor was
a stranger to diplomacy with a second-hand allegation that,
in a letter to Francis Joseph of Austria, he addressed that
individual with the wrong titlei Woodward, Britain and the
German Havy, p. 265, footnote.
I^G. P. Gooch, Harold Temperley, eds., British Documents
on the Origins of the War 1898-1914. (Bond on, 1930) VI,
#174, PP* 2165-266. (Hereafter citVcf as B. D. D.)
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Anglo-Grerman understanding.
Buelow’s attempted détente came to an abrupt end with
his resignation in July, 1909.

In the same month, the

British Parliament accepted a vastly increased Dreadnought
program;

German diplomats could not fail to grasp the

significance of this sequence of events.
Bethmann renewed negotiation immediately on assuming
office as Chancellor;

in fact, members of the Foreign

Office staff regarded his evident haste and determination
with some misgivings.
wroteÎ

Arthur Zimmermann, the Under-Secretary,

"The new Imperial Chancellor appears determined to

produce an understanding with England, and does not shrink
from grasping...the initiative himself for this purpose.
If only things work out well!"^^

series of memoranda had

been prepared during the Chancellor-crisis preceding Buelow *s
departure.

Bethmann studied these, then invited Admiral
15
Tirpitz to an interview on August 11.
On the same day,

he received word that Albert Ballin, a prominent German
businessman, had arranged a contact with the British govern
ment, which had voiced a desire to resume negotiations.

Two

days later, having received encouraging replies from Tirpitz,

^^Emst Jaeckh, Kiderlen-Waechter der Staatsmann und
Mensch. (Berlin, 1925) II, p.36.
Alfred von Tirpitz, Politische Dokumente: I, Per
Aufbau der deutschen Weltmacht. (Berlin, 1924) pp. 164Tg5l
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he went, in the company of the Admiral, to seek the Emperor's
support.

The latter approved negotiations both on a political

and a naval agreement,^^
One of the most important diplomatic skills is the
ability to recognize and exploit favorable situations of
a temporary nature.
a high level.

Here, Bethmann displayed this skill on

He recognized that his recent accession to

the Chancellorship and his extraordinary reputation for
sincerity gave him a significant but temporary advantage
17
both at home and abroad.
His precipitous haste, which the
professional diplomats had frowned on, permitted him to
re-open negotiations at a time when Anglo-German relations
seemed very poor.

Furthermore, he had succeeded in bringing

Tirpitz to drop his insistence on the three-to-four ratio in
favor of one more acceptable to England.
The Chancellor now invited Sir Edward Goschen to his
office and formally proposed negotiations on a naval and a
18
political agreement.
He explained that, for Germany, the
two agreements were necessarily connected, since a limitation
of armaments could only take place between two friendly

IGp. G. P .. XXVIII, #10325, pp. 211-16.
17

On his reputation abroad, see Viscount Grey of Fallodon,
Twenty-Five Years 1892-1916 (Hew York, 1925) and P. G. P.,
BCVIII, #1Ù328, pp. 219-20.
IGp. G. P ., XXVIII, #10330, 10331, pp. 221-22.
VI, #186-87, "pp. 283-84.

B. D. P ..
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nations.

To Goschen’s interjection that the Bitente must

not be forgotten, he replied that a formula could be found
in which Britain’s present commitments would not suffer.
Sir Edward Grey reacted very warmly and voiced satisfaction
at Bethmann’s step.

The proposal for a naval agreement

would be welcome, he explained, and the proposal for a
1Q
political agreement would receive sympathetic consideration. ^
In somewhat curious contrast to this expression of satisfac
tion, the British intimated that Sir Edward Goschen urgently
desired a vacation just then, but that this should not be
regarded as an effort to postpone negotiationsi
ever, was exactly the outcome;

.That, how

negotiations were postponed

until October.
Bethmann used the resulting pause to prepare himself
for the diplomatic task, for he intended to keep the matter
as much as possible in his own hands.

In conversations

with Die low on the eve of the Chancellor change, Bethmann
had admitted his relative lack of familiarity with diplomacy,
but claimed that he would ’’soon get the hang of foreign
policy."20

To Buelow’s great disappointment, the new

Chancellor did not come to him to "get the hang of it,"
but went instead to the temporarily disgraced KiderlenWaechter, at the time German representative in Bucharest.

19B. D. P .. VI, #187-91, pp. 284-88.
20prince von Buelow, Memoirs. (London, 1932) III, p. 12.

22.
Immediately on coming to office, Bethmann considered replac
ing von Schoen, the Secretary of State for foreign Affairs.
He had no personal dislike for Schoen, and in fact, he
worked with him very harmoniously for almost a year.

How

ever, the Chancellor, who was well aware of his own contem
plative personality, thought he could work better with a
stronger nature than that of Schoen.

Notes went from the

Foreign Office to Bucharest, informing Kiderlen of Bethmann’s
feelings in the matter, but cautioning that an obvious circumvention or brusque displacement of Schoen must be avoided.

21

When Bethmann made the customary official visit to Vienna, he
met Kiderlen and gave him the task of preparing a memorandum
on the coming Anglo-German talks.
This memorandum arrived in Berlin at the end of Septem22
her.
Kiderlen stated at the outset that he, also, regard
ed an Anglo-German detente as the worthiest objective of
German foreign policy.

Germany would not only benefit direct

ly from such a step, but Austria and Italy would show great
er loyalty to the Triple Alliance in direct relation to the
improved Anglo-German relations.

Kiderlen had no fear of a

preventive war launched by Great Britain.

He considered

far more dangerous the probability of a series of Fashodalike confrontations, which could lead to a situation in

^Ijaeckh, Kiderlen-Waechter, II, p. 41.
ZZphid., pp. 48-59.
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which Germany was forced to choose between a diplomatic set
back or a war.

Moreover, in the event of war with another

power, Germany could expect Great Britain to be on the
other side.

To avoid these two dangers, a naval agreement

must be coupled with a political understanding, if possible
with a neutrality agreement.

He considered such an agree

ment necessary to dampen the aggressive tendencies of the
Pranco-Russian partnership.
cedure for negotiation.

Kiderlen also outlined a pro

The Chancellor must avoid giving

the impression that he desired to wreck the Entente.

There

fore, the political agreement must be revealed very gradual
ly.

But it should precede the naval agreement, because the

political sphere could be adjusted more easily thama the
naval sphere, in which the intractability of the two Admir
alties might cause difficulty.
The importance of this document, and Kiderlen's impor
tance for these early negotiations, has at times been exaggerated.

23

The memorandum does not represent a blueprint

for Anglo-German relations, nor is it a startling insight
into the German diplomatic situation.

Buelow made essen

tially the same estimate of the danger in the previously
cited conference, and Bethman had voiced a similar viewpoint

^Both C. Waldron Bolen and Ernst Jaeckh imply that
Kiderlen led the negotiations from behind the scenes, that
Bethmann was merely his mouthpiece. 0. W. Bolen, "Kiderlen’s
Policy in Haval Conversation^" Journal of Central European
M fairs (July, 1949) pp. 131-49% Jaeckh, Kiderlen-Waecliter,
ÏÏ, pp. 41-45.
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even "before he became C h a n c e l l o r . N o r was the suggested
modus operandi new.

Bethmann secured the Emperor's and the

Navy Secretary's cooperation long before Kiderlen pronounced
this step essential.

Furthermore, he constantly advised

cautious procedure, particularly stressing secrecy, and he
endeavored at all times to avoid giving an impression of
25
haste once the negotiations were in progress.
This is not to underestimate the importance of Kiderlen's
memorandum.

It reinforced a number of Bethmann's ideas, and

gave him the confidence to attempt to put them into opera
tion.

Indeed, certain phrases from the memorandum reappear

ed from time to time in Bethmann's statements.

Essentially,

the Chancellor needed not Kiderlen's ideas, but his force
ful personality and his self-confidence, qualities in which
the Chancellor knew himself to be weak.

There is no need to

look far for an explanation of Bethmann's continued requests
for Kiderlen's viewpoints.

If, as seems likely, he intended

to bring Kiderlen into the Foreign Office at the earliest
opportunity, then it was only reasonable to keep him informed

24p. G, p ,.

X m i l , #10306, pp. 168-78,

^5ibid,. XXVIII, #10333, pp. 223-24 and footnote. The
German Foreign Office accepted Kiderlen's document as extreme
ly valuable, but made some very strong criticisms of his point
of view. The criticisms exposed Kiderlen's lack of under
standing of the British diplomatic situation. These marginal
notations on Kiderlen's memorandum are signed by Flotow,
whose opinions the Chancellor valued highly.
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and to consider his opinions on such a vital matter.
There were in Germany at least three great sources of
danger to the delicate secret diplomacy which Bethmann had
in mind.

One such source of danger was the fbperor.

mann dutifully kept him informed;

Beth

he noted his comments,

hut he kept him out of harm's way as much as possible on the
pretext that his name should not be connected with a venture
27
which might fail dismally.
Another potential source of
danger was German public opinion.

Germany was a late ar

rival on the colonial scene, but now that she had to a degree
arrived there, her people were at least as amenable to the
ideas of imperialism and "world power" as the people of the
older colonial powers.

In an era dominated by Admiral

Mahan's concepts of the importance of sea power, the navy
was regarded as the very embodiment of a nation's desire or
capacity for "world power" status.

Any attempt on the part

of a government to place limits on its naval construction
might be interpreted as a voluntary abdication of "world
power" rank.

Such organizations as the Navy League and the

Pan-German League had both the means and the desire to pro
pagate such views.

Secrecy was therefore essential.

A

Z^See the editor's footnote, B. G. P., XXVIII, #10333,
pp. 223-24.
^"^This was an obviously spurious excuse, since Bethmann
specifically permitted Mettemich to state in London that
the Emperor approved of the negotiations. Ibid., XXVIII,
#10333, 10338, pp. 223-24, 227.
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press report in one country based on partial, biased or
erroneous information could produce a state of public opin
ion in which no negotiations could survive,
A third source of danger for the negotiations was the
navy, particularly its Secretary of State, Admiral Tirpitz.
Bethmann's relations with him began surprisingly well, a
situation which did not last long.

On August 13» without

any evidence of pressure from the Chancellor, Tirpitz con
ceded a naval ratio more favorable to Ihgland than the
28
three-to-four ratio he had previously defended.
Two
weeks later, however, the Admiral attempted to convince
Bethmann that a slight change of form represented a further
pq
’’concession” to Great Britain,
Bethmann rebutted this
proposal in an overbearing, schoolmasterly tone, explaining
that he found it somewhat difficult to attach much importance
to the mathematical result when the actual number of ships
to be built was the same.

Indeed, since the program would

be completed somewhat sooner than under the old plan, and
thus Germany could presumably start a new naval program at

Z^Ibid., XXVIII, #10325, pp. 211-216.
^^By building one more Dreadnought in 1909, and starting
the "period of agreement” only in 1910, one Dreadnought
fewer could be built during this period, thus producing a
more favorable ratio for this period only. Tirpitz also
included a proposal for a change of Ambassadors to Great
Britain; to him, Mettemich and his ideas were anathema.
The Chancellor did not deign to notice this encroachment
on his diplomacy. Ibid.. XXVIII, #10339, pp. 227-30.
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an earlier date, he did not think the British government
would be pleasantly surprised by the concession.

Tirpitz

reverted back to his plan of August 13, which yielded a
reasonable ratio of approximately three-to-two in new
construction of capital ships.
When the talks resumed, they ran a.very-peculiar course.
It became clear in the fall of 1909 that there would be an
election in Great Britain in the near future.

Bethmann and

William II saw the danger that the naval negotiations might
become involved as an issue in these elections, or that the
behavior of the British government might be determined more
by election needs than by the course of the talks with
30
Germany.
On October 1, Bethmann telegraphed Mettemich
requesting information on the likelihood of an election.
He expressed the fear that in such an event the Liberal
government might attempt to gain a triumph out of the negotiations to help insure its re-election.

31

To prevent

this, Bethmann ordered a "dilatory procedure" until the
British political scene had cleared somewhat.
This proved to be impossible, for the British government
now showed a great desire to continue the negotiations.
October 12, Sir Edward Goschen, just returned from his

50lbid., X m i l , #10342, pp. 234-35.
Slfbid.. XXVIII, #10343, p. 235.

On

28.
"vacation," declared himself ready to begin the talks.

32

Consequently, a meeting took place on October 14, in which
Bethmann and Goschen negotiated while Schoen took notes— a
procedure which Goschen disliked.

This meeting produced

only the most careful preliminary exploration.^^

Bethmann

claimed that a political understanding would appropriately
set the stage for a naval agreement.

Such an understanding

need not include anything contrary to Great Britain’s
present friendships.

Britain had not even concluded such a

political agreement with France and Russia, Goschen observed.
But he certainly hoped that a "suitable" formula might be
found.

On the subject of the naval agreement, Bethmann made

it clear that the existing navy law must stand, but within
its framework, ship construction might be slowed down to
accomodate Great Britain.

The Chancellor carefully avoided

giving away the scope of the political agreement which he
sought.

All he would say was that it must be sufficient to

enable him to defend the naval concessions in the Reichstag.
Two weeks after this interview. Sir Edward Grey sent an
optimistic message to the German

5 2 % b i d .,

A m b a s s a d o r .

^4

Again,

XXVIII, #10346, p. 238.

5 3 l b i d ., XXVIII, #10347, p p . 239-43.
B. D. P ., VI,
#194-201, pp. 288-302. For report of October conversations,
#200,

pp.

296-98.

34D. G. P .. XXVIII, #10354, pp. 255-58.
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Grey stressed the necessity of continuing negotiation.
would say at once that we should very much regret a
suspension of negotiations.

Business here might occasionally

delay our replies, hut this would not he so great a drawback
as the total suspension of negotiations."

Grey further

expressed his willingness to include a political understand
ing, even a colonial understanding, in the negotiations.
The entire tone of the message was such that it could only
lead to expectations of rapid success.
The turning point came in the next discussion, on
35
Hoveraher 4.
Bethmann still held hack somewhat, for he
did not present the draft of the proposed agreement which
the German Foreign Office had p r e p a r e d . B u t Grey's
apparent optimism must have affected him to a degree, for
he now introduced the neutrality principle under which each
party was to state that it was not presently engaged in
agreements with aggressive design against the other, and in
the event of an attack on one party hy a third power, the
other party was to maintain neutrality.

Goschen repeated

that Great Britain had no such agreements even with France
and Russia.

Neither did Britain have a naval agreement

with those countries, replied the Chancellor;
tion with Germany was entirely new.

the situa

Sir Edward Goschen

55%hid.. XXVIII, #10355, pp. 259-62.
#204, pp. 307-9.

B. D. P.. VI,

36For a text of this agreement, see Jaeckh, KiderlenWaechter, II, pp. 67-9.
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observed that Bethmann had spoken only of a temporary slow
down of naval construction, not of a reduction of the German
plan.

Bethmann replied that naval agreements, by their very

nature, extended over a strictly limited period of time;

no

country could promise never to exceed a certain level of
naval construction.

He had in mind a proposition which could

give Great Britain a financial respite over the next few
years.

Then, depending on the world situation, a further

agreement might be contemplated.
The meeting produced an immediate change of tone on
the part of British diplomats.

Two days later. Sir Edward

Goschen, in a letter to Schoen, expressed disappointment
over the limited nature of the naval concessions, and he
doubted if his government could accept them as sufficient.
The neutrality proposal, on the other hand, went too far.^?
On November 15, Sir Charles Hardinge, a Foreign Office employee,
commented in a similar sense to Mettemich.

Finally, on

November 17, Sir Edward Grey stated that the reductions in
naval construction proposed by Geimany were not of sufficient
financial benefit

to Britain.

If the entire German program

was to remain intact, with but a small chance of real re
duction at an unspecified time in the future, then Britain
must answer

the pressure of German armaments by renewed

expansion, whatever the cost.

In view of the impending

5TP, G. P .. XXVIII, #10358, p.265.
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elections, he thought it wise to suspend negotiations for
a time.58
The question is:

what caused the sudden change in the

official attitude of the British government?

Sir Charles

Hardinge and Sir Byre Crowe, permanent employees of the
Foreign Office, claimed that the Chancellor’s last state
ments had finally exposed the whole unsavoury scheme, which
of course could not be

a c c e p t e d . 59

Great Britain, having

only one potential enemy, would gain nothing from the
neutrality agreements, Crowe explained.

Furthermore, the

shipbuilding agreement would tie her hands not only against
Germany, but against the entire world.

These two reasons

are of course, incompatible, for if îhgland had only one
probable enemy, then the limitation of that enemy’s naval
construction was quite sufficient.

Much more serious was

the same limitation for Germany, which admittedly had three
probable enemies, all of whom were naval powers of importance,
and all of whom made vast naval increases in the next few
y e a r s . I t is unlikely that the British government’s

G. P .. XXVIII, #10365, pp. 273-75.
B. B. D ., VI, #204 Foreign Office minutes, pp. 309-12,
^^In this connection it is instructive to compare the
number of Dreadnoughts building or completed from 1907 to
1914, and the amount spent on new naval construction in the
same period, for Britain, France, Russia and Geimany, These
figures are given in Woodward, Great Britain and the German
Navy, pp. 450-52, and F. N. Neilson, How ïhplomats Make War,
(#ew York, 1916) p. 146.
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drastic change of attitude was based largely on Bethmann's
further revelation of Germany's desires in the November 4
meeting.

Bethmann made substantially the same statements on

October 14 and on November 4.

The vague political agreement

of the first meeting became in the second meeting an equally
vague and extremely tentative neutrality proposal.

The

British government did not even exercise its option of pro
posing a formula which was suitable to it, but simply drop
ped the negotiations in a rather abrupt manner.

Nor did it

intend to re-open the talks immediately after the election;
in fact, months elapsed before talks were resumed.
Thus, it appears probable that Bethmann and William II
were substantially justified in their fears concerning the
impact of the elections.

When it appeared that the German

naval concessions were not of a nature that could be exploit
ed in the elections, the continuation of talks became a
handicap for the Liberal government.

Bethmann may have

made a very wise decision in refusing to negotiate a naval
construction limitation without a political agreement.

One

can imagine the internal reaction in Germany if the British
press had been able to exploit a German naval limitation in
the election campaign.

Nor would it have required a breach

of faith on the part of the British negotiators to make
such information public, since a leak to the press had been
established some time ago, and its source had not been

33.
discovered.
It can be objected that Bethmann gave the scope of the
political agreement away too soon, that he should have pro
crastinated until conditions became more favorable.

But was

it possible to continue talking in vague generalities without
making it obvious that only delay was intended?

Would the

British government not have been far more justified in
breaking off negotiations if it appeared that Bethmann was
not acting in good faith?

In view of the suddenly awakened

British desire to negotiate, the Chancellor could not risk
wrecking the negotiations by compromising his reputation of
sincerity.

This way, at least, the prospect of renewed

talks after the election remained in sight.
During the negotiations, the Chancellor maintained an
optimistic attitude;

since the temporary halt seemed justi

fied by the British elections, this fact alone did not alter
his disposition.

But during the pause in negotiations, the

optimism gradually disappeared;

Bethmann never regained

the positive attitude which he brought to these first efforts
at an understanding.^^

Early in February, he doubted that

the Liberal cabinet could still be interested in AngloGerman talks.

The need for overwhelming naval supremacy

G, P ,, XXVIII, #10358, 10364, pp. 265, 271-72.
42lbid., XXVIII, 10369, pp. 282-84.
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had become an election topic.

Present cabinet ministers

had underscored that need during the campaign.

Bethmann

felt that public opinion would preclude a resumption of
talks on a reasonable basis.
To add to the troubles of diplomacy, Bethmann now had
two unpredictable Imperial visits to Great Britain to worry
about.

In March, 1910, Prince Henry, on a "private" visit,

gave public expression to his conviction that a German
naval limitation was impossible.

But this should not alarm

Great Britain, for in the near future, the two navies would
fight side by side against the "yellow p e r i l . ( T h i s he
said to the only European ally of Japan!)

Mettemich, of

course, reported this to Bethmann, who replied that he had
specifically begged the Prince to avoid all political state
ments during his visit.

Now he, the ardent royalist, had

to disavow the public statements of an Imperial Prince!
He instructed Mettemich to explain in London that Prince
Henry was generally not in touch with politics, and that,
he had apparently no knowledge of the official German at
titude toward Anglo-German negotiations.^^

On the other

hand, the Emperor's visit on the occasion of hie uncle King
Edward's funeral progressed with unexpected smoothness.
William II managed to confine his comments pretty well to

43lbid., XXVIII, #10375, pp. 301-4.
44ibid.. XXVIII, #10377, pp. 307-8.
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expressions of sympathy.

These, delivered with his uncommon

theatrical talent, produced some spontaneous demonstrations
of goodwill toward Germany.
While the naval question lay dormant. Sir Edward Grey
made an effort to raise other issues for discussion.

He

proposed talks on the Bagdhad Railway question, on the issue
of Persian trade, and on "his favorite point," an exchange
of naval information.

With regard to the latter, he felt

that a clear knowledge of the other side's armaments would
45
do much to dispel unreasonable fears in both countries.
Bethmann hoped to utilise this opportunity to pursue his
original goal of a political agreement.

He could not grant

a concession on the Bagdhad Railway, for the building of
which German companies had obtained the right-of-way from
Turkey, without a quid-pro-quo with which to justify such a
step in Germany.

The concession which Grey offered, a re

moval of British objections to the proposed four-percent
increase in Turkish customs duties, fell far short of what
was needed.

That was, after all, a concession to Turkey,

not to Germany.

Both the Bagdhad Railway question and the

"open door" in Persia could be included in a general political

4-6

understanding.

45B. D. P ., VI, #337, p. 442.
#10382, pp. 315-14.

D. G. P .. XXVIII,

46b . D. P .. VI, #345-44, pp. 451-59.
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.

The permanent Foreign Office staff in Great Britain
made short work of Bethmann's offer.

They fastened their

attention on the neutrality clause of the political agree
ment, which was identical to the one they had rejected a
short time before.

In their interpretation, they were being

asked to promise Germany a free hand, in other words, hegemony
on the c o n t i n e n t . T h o u g h this interpretation is very
questionable, it must be admitted that Bethmann made a mis
take in returning to the rejected plan so soon.

In his

tiresome insistence on this political understanding, he lost
sight of the fact that a successful negotiation, of whatever
useless or minor character, can have profound effects on
diplomatic relations.

At this point, a nominal success could

have opened the way to his coveted political understanding.
The Chancellor’s reply, said Grey, left no further basis
for negotiation with Germany.^®
As it turned out, this was not the case, for the main
negotiations, which had been dropped more than six months
previous, received an unexpected impetus from a speech by
Prime Minister Herbert Henry Asquith.

The speech summariz

ed the previous year’s negotiations in a manner to which
Bethmann took exception.

The British reply to the German

complaint incidentally hinted at a resumption of negotia-

4^Ibid., VI, #344, Foreign Office minutes.
Sir Eyre Crowe pp. 459-60.
48lbid., VI, #345, p. 461.

Comments by
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tions, and the Chancellor decided to take up the hint.

49

The resulting talks, however, were of a nature to exclude
any possibility of agreement or benefit.

On September 14,

1910, Bethmann gave official notice of the completion of his
reply, which he intended to communicate verbally to Sir
Edward Goschen.

The latter was not in any hurry to receive

the communication, and to Bethmann's great annoyance, he
waited a month before making his appearance.^®

In his

reply, Bethmann stated that he had no objection to an ex
change of naval information, though he personally consider
ed this of little value.

If, however, he was to promise

not to expand the present navy bill, he must have an equi
valent concession from Britain, probably in the area of gen
eral p o l i c y . T h e political agreement still held a central
position in his thought !
This communication produced a remarkable series of
charges and countercharges, which illustrated the state of
nerves on both sides.

Bethmann and the German Foreign

Office saw fit to include various general and specific
charges against Great Britain's recent policies toward

49lbid., VI, #387, pp. 501-2.
5®P. G. B ., XXVIII, #10443, pp. 411-14. It is interest
ing to noie that Gooch apparently considers Bethmann respon-i
sible for the delay. He mentions only that the Chancellor tcjiok
a long time to consider the British proposal. G. P. Gooch,
Before the War— II, Studies in Diplomacy. (London, 1938) p. 209.
51p. G. P .. XXVIII, #10416-17, pp. 367-73.
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Germany.

The British Foreign Office refuted the charges,

but was particularly incensed by an alleged statement that
the ministers were themselves responsible for anti-German
52
outbursts in Britain.
The German government denied that
their dictated statement contained the offending phrase.
Both sides eventually realized that they were about to
accuse each other of deliberate falsification? and they
drew back, although neither party was satisfied.
Under the circumstances it is a tribute to the goodwill
of Grey and Bethmann that negotiations continued at all.
Still, a pause was desirable, and a new British election
offered a good pretext.

Following this election, the British

government formally proposed a scheme for the exchange of
54.
naval information.
At the same time, Sir Edward Grey, in
a speech in the House of Commons, expressed his belief that
this matter could be settled in the near future.

He also

believed that Germany might be induced to promise not to

52 B. B. P., VI, #414, pp. 546-48.
S^Documents in D. G. P . support the German contention
that the German statement was incorrectly reported. The
B. D. D . support the British contention that the German
Foreign Office changed the draft of the dictated memorandum
following British protests. C. W. Bolen and B, L. Woodward
agree with this version which, on balance, seems the more
likely one. Both authors place the responsibility (alleged)
on Kiderlen, not on Bethmann. C. W. Bolen, "Kiderlen's Policy
in Naval Conversations,” Journal of Central European Affairs,
(July, 1949) p. 142, and Ë.' 1. Woodward, Great Britain and'
the German Navy, pp. 288-91•
54p. G. P.. XXVIII, #10429, pp. 390-91.
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increase her present naval p r o g r a m . B e t h m a n n turned the
proposal over to Admiral Tirpitz, who suggested minor changes
to insure a simultaneous exchange of plans.

With this change,

Bethmann declared himself ready to accept the proposal.
The British accepted the change, and held out the possibility
of extending the talks to cover a "political agreement" as
a concession to Bethmann's desire, but only on the Bagdhad
Railway and Persian trade questions.
This brought Bethmann further exasperation.

Under the

guise of a political agreement, he was asked once again to
negotiate strictly on questions in which Geimiany should
make the major concessions!

Germany, which had the con

cession for the Bagdhad Railway, was to relinquish the most
profitable part of it with little compensation.

Germany,

which had the status of "most favoured nation" in Persian
trade, was to place limitations on this status.

Further

more, the Chancellor suspected that the secrecy of negotia
tions had been broken;

Goschen had inadvertently mentioned

that Prance and Russia were told of the negotiations for the

55ibid., Tirpitz took the Chancellor to task, after the
war, for failing to react more positively to this speech,
which he interpreted as a concession to the German proposal
of a three-to-two standard of construction. Actually, the
speech was merely an answer to inevitable questions in the
Commons, of which Bethmann had been informed beforehand.
Tirpitz, Aufbau, II, p. 189. D. G. P., XXVIII, #10433,
10435, pp. 395, 398.
56ibid., ZXTTTI, #10438, p. 402.
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information exchange, but when Bethmann pressed him on the
exact extent of the information that had been given, the
Ambassador gave only evasive answers.

57

By this time the Chancellor entertained little hope
that these negotiations would bring success.

In a memor

andum to Mettemich, he expressed his growing impatience
with British procedure in the various t a l k s . T h e i r pro
crastination had cost so much time that a retardation of
the navy program was now no longer possible.

Nor was it

desirable, since British and French naval increases had
created an entirely new situation.

Herewith the only

common basis for the t^lks had disappeared;

he did not

believe Great Britain could suggest a new basis.

Their

efforts to negotiate separately on the Bagdhad Railway and
Persian trade questions were not steps in the right direction.
The rapid progress on the naval information question impressed
him not at all, for he had always considered such an agree59
ment to be useless.
If its intention was to dispel public

5 ? i b i d ., XXVIII, #10438, 10439, p p. 402-3, Anlage.
The suspicion was well founded. Russia and France were
informed of the extent of these and of previous negotiations,

G. P ., XXVIII, #10433, p. 395.
59

The notion that such a step could prevent each party
from "stealing a march" on the other party by secret buildup
is rather absurd. In early 20th century Europe, it was by
no stretch of the imagination possible to build a battleship
secretly.
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fear, then only Great Britain could benefit, for in Grermany
there was no fear of the British naval expansion.

The

British had repeatedly assured him that the Entente had no
anti-German intentions, that therefore a political agreement
was unnecessary.

Yet they refused to believe his assurances

that the German navy had not been built against Britain, but
only for the protection of German shores and German trade.
The later history of the naval information talks under
lined the futility of these negotiations.

When Germany had

tentatively accepted the last English draft, the Agadir
crisis intervened.
layed for months.

1

The British answer was therefore de

During this delay, the Foreign Office

found fault with the provision that details should be ar
ranged by the Admiralties.

Thus, their long-delayed answer
62
contained further changes, which would require more talks.
The proposal simply disappeared from the diplomatic scene.
The most striking aspect of Bethmann’s diplomatic

efforts during his first attempt at a detente with Great
Britain is the fact that his basic position remained the
same from beginning to end.

For him, the main fact of inter^

national relations was Germany’s "encirclement.”

To break

60p. G. P .. XXVIII, #10445, p. 395.
Gllbid., XXVIII, #10453, p. 424.
62•B. D. P., VI, #472, p. 461.
Crowe.)

(Memorandum by Sir Eyre
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this encirclement, and thereby to dispel the danger of war,
British friendship was vital.

He regarded as sheer lunacy

any thought of naval limitation in relation to Great Britain
when that country continued to support the two countries
which were diplomatically opposed to Germany and which could
in the meantime increase their naval armaments at will.
Therefore, a political settlement with Great Britain was
absolutely essential.

If such a settlement became a reality,

British fear of the justified German naval expansion would
disappear.

After all. Great Britain was not at all alarmed

by the expansion of the American fleet.

Obviously, an Anglo-

German political agreement was the key to Germany’s (and
Europe’s) diplomatic dilemma.
The Chancellor’s summary of the situation was realistic,
and formally correct.

His goodwill and his dedication to

his task were unquestioned.

But his procedure in putting

his convictions into practice in a diplomatic situation left
much to be desired.

He made no concessions to the fact that

British policy depended to a considerable degree on public
o p i n i o n . H e was convinced that British friendship could be

^It is ironic that Bethmann clearly understood the in
fluence of public opinion in Britain, although he failed, in
general, to adjust his diplomacy accordingly. Concerning the
elections in January 1910, he states, ”0n the one hand, the
need for an overwhelming naval superiority was so emphasized
during the election— even lloyd George and Grey spoke in that,
sense— that it seems doubtful it the Liberal cabinet, which
knows the limits within which we can meet, it in the naval
question, can, in the face of public opinion, let itself get
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assured only by treaty, in a formal manner.

It did not

occur to him that this friendship could be cultivated by a
careful cultivation of public opinion.

Useless or meaning

less agreements, ostentatiously concluded, could have done
much to achieve this.

But Bethmann always had in mind the

one treaty which could be a panacea for all ills.
Of Bethmann*s ventures into the field of diplomacy, his
first attempt at an Anglo-German friendship was probably the
one in which he was most directly involved, to which he gave
the most personal attention.

Though he depended on his

Foreign Secretary a great deal, especially on Kiderlen when
he came to the office, it is certain that the direction of
policy was Bethmann’s, not Kiderlen's, as the letter's
biographer, Jaeckh, maintains.

The Chancellor has generally

been described as a weak, vacillating, dependent individual.
Of these characteristics there is little evidence in this
part of his diplomacy.

But he is also described as being

completely unadaptable, and this characteristic is illustra
ted to perfection in the Anglo-German negotiations from 1909
to 1911.

involved in an agreement which we could accept....We also
must make allowances for the precarious position of the
liberal government," (D. G. P ., XX7III, #10369, pp. 282-84.)
Yet he did not follow his own advice. His conclusion was
that, in view of the state of British public opinion, a
political agreement was all the more vital.

CHAPTER

II

,THE AGADIR "COUP” AED AEGLO-GERMAB RELATIONS
When, in 1908, Chancellor Buelow had attempted to re
dress what he considered Germany’s increasingly dangerous
international position, an important part of his efforts
consisted of a planned detente with Prance.

In Pranco-

German relations, the Morocco question was the problem
which seemed to admit solution;

for Germany, very important

results could be expected from a reasonable adjustment of
that question.

In every dispute with Prance over Morocco,

the European powers had supported Prance and had left Germany
virtually isolated.

Por that reason alone, an adjustment of

the problem was desireable;

but the German Ambassador in

Great Britain furnished another reason;

if Germany desired

British friendship as Buelow claimed, then she must improve
her relations with Prance.

This was a precondition for an

for an approach to Great Britain,^
The Pranco-German adjustment of the Morocco question

In April 1904, Great Britain and Prance had signed and
published a "Declaration" which was, in fact, an alliance,
although it did not provide for definite military co-opera
tion. The agreement settled a number of colonial disputes
and recognized Morocco as a Prench sphere of influence. The
German Foreign Office thus knew of the Anglo-Prench Morocco
connection, though they did not fully realize its extent,
for the declaration included a secret clause providing for
an extention of Prench authority in the event of the Sultan’s
collapse.
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took the form of a treaty, signed at Casablanca in February
2
of 1909.
Germany recognized France's special political
interests in Morocco.

France, on the other hand, re-affirmed

the principle or the "open door" in matters of commerce, and
specifically undertook not to place obstacles in the way of
German commerce in that country.

The two parties re-affirmed

the Act of Algeciras and the integrity and independence of
the "Shereefian Eapire."
Though the agreement caused a great deal of public re
joicing at the outset, it contained basic weaknesses which
rendered its permanent success very doubtful.^

Its clauses

were extremely vague and admitted of many conflicting inter
pretations.

To what degree did it recognize France's special

political interests?

How could such interests be reconciled

with the declared independence and territorial integrity of
Morocco?

Was France obligated to assure concessions for

German commerce, must she support German attempts to gain
such concessions, or did she merely have to avoid active
opposition to them?
other powers?

What was the economic position of the

To these questions the treaty provided no

specific answers, and it was thus unlikely that it could

^D. G. P ., XXIV, i^410, pp. 379-81. For Germany's
reasons for concluding the Morocco agreement with France,
#8424, 8476, 8499, pp. 395, 369-73, 494-98.
^Ima C. Barlow, The Agadir Crisis. (Chapel Hill, 1940)
pp. 77-79.
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produce the expected thaw in Franco-German relations.
Indeed, from the beginning, the two countries mistrusted
each other’s intention.

Germany expected France to subvert

the independence of Morocco, to attempt to gain a protector
ate over the country;

France refused to believe in Germany’s

political and territorial disinterest,
Bethmann Hollweg personally made every effort to live
up to Germany's ill-defined promises.

In December 1909» he

delivered a conciliatory speech in the Reichstag, comment
ing on the improvement in Franco-German relations as a
result of the Casablanca treaty.^

Just two days after this

date, the Sultan, evidently feeling French political pres
sure, offered Germany a coaling station on Morocco’s Atlan
tic coast, with the explanation that such a step could help
him to resist the growing political incursion of the ’♦Western
Powers,"5

Bethmann had no desire to be played against

France for the Sultan’s benefit, and he instructed the
Foreign Office to inform France of the offer, which should
be rejected.^

While Bethmann intended to keep the agreement,

certain commercial concerns and imperially-minded societies
in Germany certainly had other intentions.
In February 1910 the French government, faced with the

^D. G. P.. XXIX, #10492, p. 39» editors' footnote.
Sibid., XXIX, #10488, p. 37.
^Ibid.. XXIX, #10489» pp. 37-40, editors’ footnote.
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Sultan's refusal to accept the conditions of the French loan
which should help him to meet his international obligations,
decided to apply diplomatic pressure to assure acceptance
of the loan's terras.

The pressure was to take the form of

a withdrawal of diplomatic representatives from the Sultan's
capital.

Again, Bethmann advised cooperation with France;

he explained that Germany had no political interest and
would consequently make no difficulties if France thought
7
such a step advisable.
On March 10, Bethmann moved against
the demands of commercial interests;

he stated unequivocal

ly that his government would not go beyond its international
obligations to secure economic benefits for concerns like

8

Mannesmann Bros.

Despite the Chancellor's goodwill, it soon appeared
that the Franco-German Casablanca agreement, far from
liquidating the Moroccan problem, had actually aggravated
it.

Berman commercial interests besieged the Foreign Office

with complaints that the French were violating the "open
door" clause.

Mannesmann Bros,, unable to secure the co

operation of the German government for a protectorate scheme

^Ibid., m x , #10501, p, 46,
Q
Barlow, Agadir, p. 137. Sultan Mulay Hafid had grant
ed the firm of Mannesman Bros, extensive mining concessions
in South Moroccol The French government questioned the
validity of these concessions on the basis of the Act of
Algeciras, and the German government concurred with the Frenoh
view, Mannesmann Bros, obtained extensive support from G e r m ^
public opinion, and insisted that the Government support the|r
claim. Bethmann and Kiderlen consistently refused such support.
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in south-west Morocco, combined forces with the Pan-German
League to buy or influence newspapers for the purpose of
converting public opinion to an acceptance of German politi
cal adventures in the area of their

interest.^

Meanwhile,

French penetration, which should have been expected to a
degree from the terms of the Casablanca agreement, proceed
ed to turn Morocco into a virtual French protectorate.
Sultan Mulay Hafid endeavoured to shore up Morocco's finances,
but became increasingly entangled in financial obligations
to F r a n c e . S i n c e this made him very unpopular, French
authorities soon had to protect him and his officials from
the Moroccan people.

The very vocal French militarist and

expansionist circles regarded this as a great opportunity.
Their ardor at times produced surprising indiscretions;
for example, a colonial official, in a public New Year's
address, told his countrymen that Morocco was well on the
way to becoming French, that France would soon exercise
11
sovereignty.
Throughout 1910, German representatives
reported a series of small French military advances and a

Q

Otto Hamman, The World Policy of Germany 1890-1912.
(New York, 1927) pp. È2Ù-21. Barlow. Agadir, pp. 154-35.
^^For example, the question of his French loan in
February of 1910, the terms of which he accepted only under
duress. D. G. P ., XXIX, #10502, pp. 46-7.
^^Ibid., XXIX, #10493, p. 40. The speech, reported in
Germany, brought ah official German protest, and a French
disavowal.
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consequent spread of French authority.

12

Moreover, every

French advance produced a renewed outburst of unrest in
Morocco, which the French were obliged to quell.

Thus,

while French authority extended itself, trade stagnated and
travel became nearly impossible for Europeans because of
the hostility of the populace.
Each French advance, taken singly, was so small and so
plausibly justified that Germany could not make official
protests, but the German government was fully aware that the
spread of French authority, when taken as a whole, was a
violation of both the Act of Algeciras and the Casablanca
Treaty.

Under the circumstances, the German government had

to be content with vague expressions of uneasiness.

In

diplomatic language, these took the form of expressions of
hope that Prance would not take actions which might increase
13
the unrest in Morocco to the further detriment of trade.
This background lends significance to reports from
the German representative in Tangiers, dated March 1911»
that there were growing disturbances in the vicinity of the
Moroccan c a p i t a l . j f e attributed the unrest to three factors:
the increased taxation and the attempted strengthening of

IZibid., XXIX, #10498, 10522, pp. 43, 73-74, and others
in chapters CCXXVI and CCXXVII,
^^Ibfd., XXIX, #10513, pp. 58-59, represents such a
warning ifrbm Kiderlen to the French government,
l^lbid,, XXIX, #10524, pp, 75-76.
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of govemiaent authority through the formation of a regular
army were partly responsible.

The main factor, however,

was the recent action of Major Mangin, French commandant of
the Sultan's troops, who had ordered the public execution
of two Moslem soldiers for the crime of desertion.

Offend

ed Moslem religious sensibility had actually triggered the
present disturbances.
The situation brought immediate action from the French
government which, on the fifth and sixth of April, notified
Great Britain and Germany that a French military expedition
to Fez might soon be necessary for the protection of Europeans
in that city.

The notification to Britain more clearly

revealed French intentions, probably because it was deliver
ed verbally.

In fact, Sir Arthur Nicolson, who received the

message, gathered that the support of the Sultan was a far
greater factor than assurance of the safety of Europeans in
Fez.

If that were the case. Sir Arthur feared that this

military expedition might assume the character of a rather
extended occupation.
The French communication prompted a more direct warning
from the German Foreign O f f i c e . " H a p p i l y , " Kiderlen said,
...the latest news from Fez is of a more favourable
nature, and it does not appear that there is imminent

ISlbld., XXIX, #10526, pp. 78-79.
#202, pp. 186-87.
I^ibid., XXIX, #10527, pp. 79-80.

B. B. P .. VII,
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danger (to European residents)....An expedition such as
is contemplated by the French government can only pro
duce further agitation...it is unnecessary to repeat
the experience of Casablanca.
17
Bethmann issued a similar warning to France on April 19.
He told the French Ambassador Jules Gambon that, in his
opinion, the French action could only excite more unrest,
and that the military expedition, once in Fez, would find
it very difficult to withdraw from there.
raised this question:

Gambon then

in a case of absolute necessity,

could Bethmann refuse permission to rescue the Europeans?”^®
The Chancellor's answer was determined by the nature of the
question.

He could not give a categoric "no" to such a

question, but he urgently hoped that the situation would not
arise.

Apparently the French Foreign Office regarded the

Chancellor's statement as a concession;

in the French

government's estimate of the situation, the case of "abso19
lute necessity" happened to arise the very next day.
On April 25, Bethmann made a summary of developments
for the Emperor.

20

Reports from Fez, he wrote, continued

I7lbid., XXIX, #10535, pp. 85-86.
^®In a later interview, reported by Sir E. Goschen,
Gambon claimed that he had held out to Bethmann the example
of Gladstone, who had tarried in the case of the expedition
to save Gordon in Khartoum, and who was subsequently blamed
for Gordon's death. Gambon gave no indication of the Chan
cellor's reply to this lesson from the pages of history,
B. B. P ., VII, #234, pp. 211-212.
G. P .. XXIX, #10537, pp. 86-88.
20lbid., XXIX, #10542, pp. 92-93.
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to be contradictory;

French sources painted the situation

•’black on black," while German and Austrian sources saw
little danger to Europeans in the city, though they admitted
that Sultan Mulay Hafid was in trouble.

The French press,

largely supported by the British press, sought to convince
the French government to advance troops to the city;

the

German press seemed quite reasonable, with the exception of
Fan-German papers.

The French Ambassador had come to

Bethmann's office repeatedly, and the Chancellor had given
him to understand that the contemplated expedition could
bring international complications.
Meanwhile, the conflicting reports and diplomatic
jockeyings brought to the surface the undercurrent of AngloGerman distrust, which was particularly evident in the
British Foreign Office.

From the British Ambassador in

Austria came a warning that Germany intended to create a
Franco-Spanish quarrel out of the Moroccan developments,
and that she had already taken action to achieve this end.
Sir Byre Crowe and Sir Arthur Nicolson annotated this
document with the observations that Germany most likely
intended to create "the maximum mischief," that she would
then urge upon Britain and Russia a political agreement

21 B. X>, P.. VII, #214, pp. 197-98.

21

55.

pp

designed to separate the Entente.

Other reports from

British ambassadors and from French sources portrayed
Germany as lying in ambush, waiting for France to entangle
herself irredeemably before coming forth to "make trouble"
in some mysterious and dastardly fashion.

These reports

all implied that Great Britain should give maximum support
25
to France,
German documents indicate a similar, if less intense
suspicion of Great Britain.

Early in spring, Bethmann re

ceived two reports of alleged Anglo-French staff talks on
the problems of a British expeditionary force in the event of
24
war against Germany.
One report, from Ambassador Metternich, made the point that France might soon demand concrete
proof from Great Britain that the Entente was still solid.
The Chancellor was aware of the importance of the British
government's stand on the Morocco question.

In June, he

had occasion to recommend to Admiral Tirpitz a prompt
acceptance of the British changes in the information exchange

Ibi^., VII, #214, pp. 197-98. At this time, negotia
tions were in progress over the exchange of naval information
between Britain and Germany. The Foreign Office had just
rejected Bethmann*s offers of a neutrality agreement, and
the place was still abuzz with indignation.
Z^Ibid., VII, #208-11, p.230.
24p. G. P .. XXIX, #10520, 10521, pp. 66-69, 69-70.
The editors' footnote to #10520 gives a surprisingly accurate
analysis by the German military attache in Britain, Major
Winterfeldt, of the extent and the problems of a British
expeditionary force.
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agreement.

25

.

The present political situations, he told

Tirpitz, made it very desirable to achieve a positive result
in the Anglo-German talks.
On May 15, the French government gave official notice
in the capitals of Europe that it intended to "relieve" the
26
city of Fez with a French military column.
The action
was not unexpected, and the German Foreign Office had
already planned a move in reply.

From the heightened con

cern of the British and French officials it is obvious
that they also expected a German reply.

Given Germany's

position in Morocco by virtue of the Casablanca agreement,
she could not very well continue with vague expressions of
apprehension;
counter-move.

the French move demanded a substantial
27

In view of this, two incidents take on a

heightened significance:

on May 18, Sir Edward Grey explain

ed to Mettemich that the British government supported the
French expedition, and would continue this support even if
OQ
a lengthy occupation of Fez should prove necessary.
A
week later, the British Ambassador made substantially the

25%bid., XXVIII, #10449, p. 420.
^^Ibid.. XXIX, #10559, pp. 118-19.
27
For various expressions of suspicion of or expecta
tion of German action in reply to a French march to Fez,
see B, B. D ., VII, chapter LII.
28ibid., VII, #278, p. 256.
p. 119.

D. G. P ., XXIX, #10561,
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same statement in a conversation with B e t h m a n n . T h e
Chancellor could have little doubt that Great Britain in
tended thereby to strengthen the French government's position
for the expected showdown with Germany,

Such an action fit

ted precisely into Bethmann's concept of the anti-German
direction of British diplomacy.
Because of the great subtlety of the French penetra
tion of Morocco, Germany's freedom of action was quite
limited.

She could permit the French march to Fez, making

it clear that, once the Europeans were no longer in danger,
France must withdraw from the area.

This step would un

doubtedly produce French assurances that such was indeed
the government's intention.

Then, unavoidable incidents

could be counted on to delay a withdrawal of troops, and
Germany would be faced with the same diplomatic situation
again and again.

Public opinion in Germany and foreign

expectation of German action was a guarantee that such pro30
cedure would be considered a German diplomatic defeat.
Or, Germany could insist on strict enforcement of the Act
of Algeciras and of the Franco-German understanding.

This

condition was impossible of fulfillment, and insistence
on it must have led to war.

A third alternative was a

29s. D. P ., VII, #306, p. 276.
^^Theodor Wolff, The Eve of 1914. (New York, 1936),
p. 39 gives a good résumé of the tone of public opinion
in Europe immediately following the French advance.
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German surrender of claims in Morocco with adequate compen
sation for Germany’s commercial interests in that country.
But since there were very few separate instances of French
penetration of sufficient import to justify strong diplomatic
action, it was imperative to avoid postponement of a decision
through vague negotiations.
It is difficult to determine the precise origin of the
plan to dispatch a warship to the Port of Agadir on Morocco's
west coast.

Even more difficult is it to trace the Chan

cellor’s personal responsibility for the plan;

in this

instance, Bethmann’s direct role was much smaller than it
had been in the Anglo-German negotiations.^^

At any rate,

there is little evidence to support the widely-held assump
tion that Bethmann disapproved of the plan to dispatch war
ships.

For one thing, it is simply not in keeping with

the man's character to defend an action which in his opinion

^ This is evident in D. G. P ., XXIX. If the editors'
selection of documents is is unbiased, Bethmann produced far
fewer communications than he had produced on the subject of
naval negotiations. Kiderlen emerges as the dominant force
in this volume.
32
Wolff cites a short, obscure reference by Kiderlen
about Bethmann's interference as indicative of the latter's
displeasure at the proposed dispatch of warships. But it
is by no means clear what Bethmann disapproved of, and there
is no reason to assume that it was the idea of the ship
dispatch. Wolff, Eve, p. 43. E. I. Woodward's few cryptic
remarks also imply that Bethmann was the unwilling follower
in this case. Woodward, Great Britain and the German Navy,
pp. 309-12. G. P. Gooch is oi the same opinion. 6ooch,
Before the War, II, Studies in Diplomacy and Statecraft,
p. 2lé.
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could endanger world peace.

Then, Bethmann had himself

contemplated the dispatch of warships to Moroccan ports in
the Loan Crisis of 1910, and he had actually approached
33
the Emperor with this idea.
True, the situation was a
different one,

Bethmann had intended only a protection of

German citizens, and presumably he would have dispatched
ships to ports where there actually were such citizens to
protect; moreover, he took no steps to develop this tenta
tive suggestion.

But it seems very unlikely that he now

objected to the idea of the ship dispatch as a type of
"pistol point diplomacy,"

Nor could he have been much

impressed by the fact that Agadir was, by the Act of Algecir
as, a "closed harbour," for he knew that the French had used
closed harbors for the purpose of troop s u p p l y . T h e
attempts to dissociate the Chancellor from the decision to
dispatch the Panther are based on the questionable assumption
that this was a sinister, saber-rattling move with which a
man of Betlimann's undoubted integrity could not well be con
nected,

It is easier to portray the Chancellor as a reluctant

pawn than as a reckless adventurer.

Both pictures are equal

ly distorted by the original assumption about the "Panther *s
spring,"
On May 3» Kiderlen presented the Chancellor with a

G. P ,, XXIX, #10502, pp. 46-47.
54ibid., XXIX, #10566, pp, 124-27.
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memorandum reviewing the Moroccan situation and the expected impact of the Fez expedition.

The most important part

of the memorandum proposed the dispatch of warships to Agadir
and Mogador with the intention of inducing the French govern
ment to negotiate on a serious compensation offer.

Kiderlen

wished to grasp this opportunity to solve the dilemma which
faced German diplomacy in the form of the gradual hut con
tinuous French advance in Morocco,

The fact that Bethmann

supported this position in an audience with the Emperor is
sufficient proof that he did not regard the plan as heing
in any way sinister, and that he gave it his full approval.
But, while the Chancellor was in touch with and approved
of the broad outlines of the plan, some important details
were arranged without his knowledge.

The aide-memoire

which was sent to the European capitals on June 30 was based
on a collective complaint from eleven German firms with in
terests in the south of Morocco, and this collective com
plaint was solicited by the Foreign Office, without Bethmann*s
knowledge, from Dr, Regendanz, managing director of the
Hamburg-Marokko Gesellschaft.^^

35lbid.,

m x,

Thus, the occasion and

#10549, pp. 101-8 .

^^There was, indeed, not a single German to protect at
Agadir, and Dr. Regendanz even arranged for a German to go
posthaste from Mogador to be on hand when his protection
arrived. However, he got there two days after the Panther's
arrival. For details of the Regendanz arrangements, see
F. W. Pick, "Hew Light on Agadir," The Contemporary Review
(Sept., 1957), pp. 525-54. The editors of D. G. P . devoted
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the ostensible reason for the ship dispatch were arranged
without the Chancellor's previous approval.

But, when he

heard of the plan, he gave it his support and helped to
convince the Smperor of its suitability,

William II gave

his approval, and Kiderlen set the plan in motion with the
37
laconic telegram: "Ships approved."
The attitude of the powers immediately following the
dispatch gave Bethmann no cause to fear a violent reaction.
While the aide-memoire of June 30 had used only the spurious
justification produced by Dr. Regendanz, the Ambassadors
had been instructed to make a verbal explanation mentioning
breaches of the Algeciras Act and Branco-German compensation
t a l k s , O n July 3, Bethmann wrote to William II that
European public opinion was, on the whole, favorable.
"This is true even of the English press," he stated, "with
exception of a few conservative papers."

39

Apparently,

he had expected a more violent outburst from that quarter.
Bor did the ambassadorial reports indicate any danger
from Great Britain.

Sir Edward Grey only expressed concern

over the possibility of a settlement among France, Germany,

only a short footnote to the incident, explaining that it
was merely a matter of the ostensible, not the realreason
for the dispatch of the ship. D. G. P .,XXIX, #10576, p.
152, editors' footnote.
G. P .. XXIX, #10576,

p .

152.

38lbid., XXIX,

#10578, p. 1^3.

59lbid., XXIX,

#10587, pp. 163-64.
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and Spain, to the exclusion of British interests.

.

Metter-

nich assured him that Germany had no such intentions.
Aware of the potential danger from Great Britain,
Bethmann at once sent instructions to his

A m b a s s a d o r . ^0

Germany, he was to explain, fully realized that Great
Britain might need to take similar steps in order to ensure
consideration of her interests.

He added that he inter

preted Great Britain's concern over her own interests as
a form of approval of Germany's action, which had been
taken for precisely analogous reasons.

Metternich did

not get a chance to make this statement, for Sir Edward
Grey gave official notice of Great Britain's determination
not be excluded from a Moroccan settlement.

Metternich

therefore confined himself to another assurance that Germany
did not intend to exclude Great Britain, or to encroach
upon her "legitimate interests.
While the diplomatic reactions seemed entirely satis
factory, Bethmann was hard-pressed to avoid a domestic
crisis over the Branco-German negotiations which the Panther's
presence at Agadir had set in motion.

The Emperor was on a

northern holiday when he received Bethmann's reports of the
unhurried procedure of these negotiations.

Now he became

anxious, for he feared that "third parties" would intervene

40lbid., XXIX, #10590, p. 166.
41lbid., XXIX, #10592, p. 167.
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if negotiations dragged on too long.
worried about England.

He was particularly

In footnotes to Bethmann’s reports

and in a separate telegram, William II voiced his displeasure
in a lively manner.

What annoyed him most was the state

ment that "energetic bearing" might become necessary to
achieve results with Prance.

"The monarch amuses himselfÎ

And in the meantime we steer directly for mobilization]
Without me that must not h a p p e n . H e r e were the seeds
of an internal crisis;

not only did the Emperor threaten

to return home to interfere in the delicate negotiations,
but Kiderlen sent Bethmann his resignation on the grounds
that the Emperor's comments were intended as a censure of
43
his proceedings,
Bethmann kept his head, and thereby undoubtedly avert
ed an internal crisis with serious diplomatic overtones;
the hasty return of William II coupled with the resignation
of the foreign Secretary would have been interpreted as a
German panic.

The Chancellor sent William II a soothing

telegram, explaining that no threats had been made to Prance
or to any foreign power, and that no such threats would be
made as long as he headed the government;

the Emperor's

42lbid., XXi::, #10600, 10601, 10607, 10608, pp. 177-78,
184 -8 8 .
45jaeokh, Kiderlen-Waechter, II, first resignation,
pp. 128-29, second resignation, pp. 132-34.
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return was therefore not r e q u i r e d . F o l l o w i n g this, he
sent off a lengthy explanation in which he defended Kider
len ’s handling of the situation as based on mandates given
by William II himself.

4-5

Meanwhile, he held Kiderlen off

by sending him a copy of the same statement with the ex
planation that his policy had the Chancellor's full support.
He asked him not to take further steps until he had dis
cussed the matter with him p e r s o n a l l y . T h i s delaying
action worked;

three days later William II gave permission

to carry on negotiations on the "lines previously agreed
upon," thus removing all cause for Kiderlen's resignation.
Diplomatically, things were deceptively quiet after
the initial ripple caused by the Panther's dispatch.
Certainly, no indication of British displeasure came to
Bethmann's attention before July 20.

During an interval

of twenty days from the Panther's dispatch to the outbreak
of the Anglo-German crisis, the British Ambassador made
47
only one appearance at the German Foreign Office.
On
that occasion, Kiderlen gave him yet another assurance that

44p. G. P .. XXIX, #10611, pp. 189-90.
45ibid., XXIX, #10615, pp. 191-95.
46.
Jaeckh, Kiderlen-Waechter, II, p. 131.
4?B. D. D., VII, #322-77, pp. 289-359. Goschen's
visit, #373, p. 356. Goschen gave as reason for his visit,
"^ome minor matter."
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Germany did not wish to negotiate with Prance and Spain to
the exclusion of Great Britain,

Bethmann hoped that the re

fusal to permit Spanish participation in the Pranco-German
negotiations would lend credibility to this assurance.
On July 20 came the first hint of a change in Britain’s
apparent quiescence.

Metternich reported on an article in

the Times, in which alleged German territorial demands were
/Q
outlined on a map of the Congo area of Africa.
The article
stressed the British interests involved in the area and the
immense size of the German ’’demand.”

In view of this, the

writer doubted if the demand had been made with serious
intentions to negotiate;

it seemed more likely that Germany

wished to bring about a French rejection, in which case
she would claim territory in the vicinity of Agadir.

The

following day, Metternich reported a meeting with Sir Edward
Grey in which the Foreign Secretary voiced fears which were
49
very similar to those expressed in the Times article.
Grey could not go so far as to accuse Germany of deliberate
ly making impossible demands, but Metternich reported him
saying essentially that, in diplomatic language:

48p. G. P .. XXIX, #10616, p.198.
49lbid., XXIX, #10617, pp. 199-203. For Sir Edward
Grey’s version of the conversation, which is essentially
the same as that here reported, see B. D. D., VII, #411,
pp. 390-91.
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Since Prance obviously could not grant the cession of
French Congo territory to the Sangha River, including
French purchase options on the Belgian Congo, it seemed
likely that the talks would return to the Moroccan terri
tory, where there were strong British interests. Con
sequently, the question of German intentions in Agadir
arose again.
It is unlikely that Bethmann was unduly disturbed by this
report;

he knew that Grey's fears were groundless, that

Germany desired no territory in Morocco.

Since Mettemich

had asked for instructions, Bethmann could assume that no
drastic action would be taken in Great Britain until the
German reply was known,
long before Metternich received the instructions of
his government, Lloyd George, Chancellor of the Exchequer,
made his Mansion House speech, which turned the delicate
diplomatic situation into an Anglo-German crisis.

50

The

offending passage was verycbscurely worded, but the situa
tion then prevailing made it applicable only to one nation:
If a situation were to be forced upon us in which
peace could only be preserved by the surrender of the
great and beneficent position Britain has won by cen
turies of effort and achievement, by allowing Britain
to be treated where her interests are vitally affected
as if she were of no account in the cabinet of nations,
then I say emphatically that peace at that price would
be a humiliation intolerable for a great nation like
ours to endure.
The intention of the speech is not obvious.

Sir Edward

Grey had already indicated his concern over the fact that
the German government had not chosen to reveal its intention

50 Ibid., VII, #411, p. 391.
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and official position more clearly;

in view of the impend

ing discussion of foreign policy in the House of Commons,
Grey needed specific information on German activities and
designs in Agadir and southern Morocco.

51

Presumably, this

was the reason for his talk with Metternich on July 21,

If

this also explains the warning contained in the Mansion
House speech, if that speech was only a demand for more
complete information, then the diplomacy of Sir Edward Grey
was in this instance dangerously inconsistent.

On the other

hand, the French government had just indicated its need for
diplomatic support;

the French found it difficult to under

stand Great Britain's silence, and doubted the solidarity
52
of the Entente.
As dear as the Entente was to the Foreign
Office staff, it is still hard to believe that the Mansion
House speech was Sir Edward Grey’s answer to that French
plea.

After all, such important aspects of diplomacy are

not decided on in the casual manner in which Lloyd George's
55
speech was approved.
Probably Gooch comes closest to an
answer, that Sir Edward Grey simply did not realize the

Sllbid., 711, #399, p. 377.
52lbid., VII, #408-9, pp. 385-86.
55

Viscount Grey of Fallodon, Twenty-Five Years 1892-1916.
In his memoirs, page 225-26, Grey made the surprisingly
naive comment that the speech had done much to prevent a war
in 1911. It is almost certain that such was not its intention;
it is certain that such was not its effect.
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explosive nature of such a statement in that diplomatic
54setting.
In this light, the speech appears as a diplomatic
blunder which, because of reactions from the press and public
opinion, could not be disavowed or mitigated with explana
tory statements.
Some time after the event, in a Reichstag speech of
November 9, Bethmann claimed that it was not the speech itself
which was significant, but the subsequent jingoistic interpre
tation of it by the European press which the British govern
ment made no move to disavow, so that it was generally assumed
55
to be the official one.
The Chancellor continued;
I found myself constrained to instruct the Imperial
Ambassador in London to speak about the matter. My
representation was to the effect that we were discussing
the Morocco question with France; that England's in
terests were not so far affected thereby; and that if
îhgland should consider her interests to be affected by
the discussions, we expected the British government to
urge those interests upon the two contracting govern
ments only through the usual diplomatic channels.
In this version of Bethmann's position during the Mansion
House crisis, it appears as if he was himself responsible
for the sharp German protest delivered by Metternich on
July 25.

But the Ambassador's instruction had Kiderlen's

signature, and was clearly in his style.

Since the Secre

tary had been left in complete control of Franco-German

^^Gooch, Befoie the War, II, p. 75.
Churchill, The World Crisis, 1911-1918.
pp.

See also Winston
(London, 1932) I,

93-98.

55 B. D. P.. VII, #673-74, pp. 664-75.
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negotiations following the Panther's dispatch, he was pro
bably the real author of the protest;

Bethmann's part may

have been limited to one of official consent.

The German

government's failure to exploit this strong protest to dis
prove the charges of weakness made by its domestic critics
can, on the other hand, be attributed to Bethmann, since
he was particularly concerned with domestic politics and with
British reactions.

Friedrich Thimme made the very plausible

suggestion that the Chancellor intentionally avoided such a
use of the protest in order to prevent further deteriora57
tion of Anglo-German relations.
Throughout the crisis,
Bethmann endeavored to keep anti-British feeling at a minimum,
He considered the newspapers largely responsible for the im
pact of the Lloyd George speech, and in the Reichstag on
November 9, he made a definite accusation against the Euro
pean press. The
similar lecture;

Reichstag members themselves received a
the language which had been used was un

suitable in a "Parliament conscious of responsibility."
Turning directly to the prominent conservative Heydebrandt,
Bethmann remarked that a strong man does not "carry his

5 The majority of secondary sources attributes the
protest to Kiderlen, Jaeckh, Kiderlen-Waechter, II, p. 135*
Barlow, Agadir. p. 309. Gooch, Before the War, II, p. 221.
Priedrich Thimme, Bethmann Hollweg's Kriegsreden, (Stuttgart,
1919), XIX.
Thimme, Kriegsreden, XIX.
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sword in his m o u t h . H e

obviously had no intention of

permitting jingoistic public opinion to dictate his foreign
policy.
sure.

Not even the Imperial family could escape his cen
The Crown Prince had ostentatiously applauded a par

ticularly fire-eating Reichstag speech, and this earned him
a reprimand from the Chancellor in the presence of William I I . ^
To the Emperor's military mentality, troop and fleet move
ments represented the essence of a crisis, a fact which
Bethmann knew very well.

He answered his monarch's anxious

queries about British fleet concentrations with what appears
today somewhat exaggerated condidence:

Sir Edward Grey had

denied any connection between the crisis and fleet movements,
and he found no reason to doubt the Foreign Secretary's
word!
Bethmann showed more concern over the progress of
Kiderlen's negotiations with France.

Evidently, the letter's

procedures aroused his anxiety to such a degree that he went
to question him on July 28.

The following day, Kiderlen

accompanied the Chancellor to an audience with William II;
on that journey, Bethmann's fears were dispelled, and he
left Kiderlen a free hand in the talks with France.

Follow

ing this interview, he never doubted the peaceful conclusion

SGp. D. P .. VII. #673-74, 677, pp. 664-65, 679-81.
59

p. 37.

H. G. Zmarzlik, Bethmann Hollweg als Reichskanzler,
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of the whole affair.

Anglo-German, incidents were by no

means over, but both the Cartwright "interview" and the
Faber disclosures brought only routine inquiries from the
Chancellor as to the British government's stand;

they pro

duced no diplomatic crises, although they brought further
anti-British agitation in the German press.
In view of Bethmann*s undoubtedly sincere desire to
create an Anglo-German understanding, how can his approval
of the Agadir "coup" be justified?

Does this represent an

incomprehensible anomaly in Bethmann's long-range diplomatic
plans, as Theodor Wolff claims?^"'

The Chancellor's own

explanation after the event placed the development of the
second Morocco crisis in an entirely different light.

On August 25, an article in the Neue Freie Presse
of Vienna contained charges against Germany's Morocco diplomacy. îhe article was popularly attributed to the British
Ambassador in Austria, Sir Fairfax Cartwright. The Chancellor's
query to England brought, at first, only an unsatisfactory
explanation. After further exchanges, the British and German
governments worked out a statement which closed the question
for purposes of diplomacy, but it continued to produce heated
press exchanges. D. G. F ,, XXIX, #10645-9» pp. 237-44.
On November 1?, Captain Faber, in a speech at indover,
disclosed alleged British naval preparations during the crisis.
According to the Captain, British ships had been given instruc
tions to repel with fire the approach of German ships. Grey ^
made only a weak denial of the allegation, which did not satis
fy Bethmann, but he thought it wise not to press the matter
further. Ibid., XXIX, #10657, pp. 261-66 and editors' foot
note, #106^7"pp. 271-72.
Theodor Wolff, The Eve of 1914. (New York, 1956), p. 2^.
G^B. D. P .. VII, #674, pp. 665-76.
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’’Morocco," he said in November 1911,
was like a continually festering wound in our relations
not only with Prance but also with England....I would
say one more word thereto. In virtue of treaty stipula
tions, England stood ever on the side of Prance. Our
understanding with Prance accordingly also cleans the
slate between us and England.
After the war, he gave this explanation for the decision to
dispatch the Panther:
he (Kiderlen) came to the conclusion that Prance would
not even be brought to negotiate except by drastic means.
That is how the dispatch of the Panther to Agadir came
about....It was a defensive rejoinder to an aggressive
act.
The important question in this connection is:

did Bethmann

realize that Great Britain would support Prance when he gave
permission for the Panther’s dispatch to Agadir?

The question

cannot be answered with a direct quote from the Chancellor's
statements, but the evidence indicates that he fully expect
ed it.

Kiderlen had no illusions about British neutrality

in the a f f a i r . A memorandum from the hand of Zimmermann,
Under-Secretary in the Poreign Office, expressly stated that
British support of Prance was to be expected.

Bethmann used

this memorandum as a basis for his last audience with the
Emperor before the dispatch of the ship to Agadir.

There

after, Bethmann gave particular attention to press and govern
ment reaction in Great Britain.

It is safe to assume that he

^^Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, Reflections on the World
War. (London, 1919), p. 32.
G. P ., XXIX, #10549, pp. 101-8, editors' footnote.
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expected Great Britain to give Prance diplomatic support.
This would, moreover, fit very well into his general concep
tion of the British role in Germany's diplomatic isolation.
The crisis came, in Bethmann's opinion, not because of
British support of Prance, but because of the unorthodox
nature of that support.

The press reaction to the Mansion

House speech brought the crisis, not the Panther's appearance
at Agadir.
The press campaign had a profound effect on German
public opinion.

The negotiations were Pranco-German, yet

the crisis was an Anglo-German one!

To the public, this

was additional evidence that Germany's real enemy was not
Prance, but Great B r i t a i n . T h e crisis had a similar effect
on Bethmann;

for him, the entire history of the Moroccan

affair provided an illustration of his basic diplomatic as
sumption:

that, everywhere in the world, Germany would

find Great Britain in active diplomatic opposition, in solid
front with her Entente partners.

On November 28, 1911» he

wrote to William II about Sir Edward Grey's speech in
parliament.
(it) begins with a lengthy attempt to indict us for the
acknowledged (British) suspicion against us. The specific

^^E. M. Carrol, Germany and the Great Powers.
1938), pp. 696-99.

(New York,

G&P. G. P .. XXIX, #10661, pp. 271-72. For Sir Edward
Grey's speech, B. D, D . . VII, #721, pp. 725-35.
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facts quoted for this purpose are in some cases inaccurate,
in other cases presented in a biased light. Although the
well-known expression, that England followed our negotia
tions with goodwill, recurs a number of times, Grey still
admits such an open support of the French case that a
furthering of negotiations thereby is out of the question.
Moreover, the speech contains the admission that England
supported France even in areas where British interests
were not at all in question.
The clue to the lesson Bethmann drew from the crisis is
the phrase "supported France even in areas where British
interests were not at all in question."

This analysis deep

ened the Chancellor's inherent pessimism and prompted him to
take two steps in response.

One step was a vigorous support

for the proposed increases to the German army.

He felt that

Germany's diplomatic position held such dangers of war that
he could not be responsible for a failure to make adequate
preparations for the country's s a f e t y . A t

the same time,

he still adhered to his plan for an eventual Anglo-German
understanding, and he: refused to ,)eopardize the chances for
such an understanding by a further increase in the German
navy.

The other step which devolved from the Agadir crisis

was a renewed effort at improvement of Anglo-German relations.
The legacy of Agadir played an important part in the failure
of that effort.

Bethmann made the most determined political

stand of his career in an attempt to prevent further in
creases to the German navy, but the anti-British tone of
public opinion defeated him.

^^Thimme, Kriegsreden, XX.
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The Chancellor’s procedures during the Haldane mission
provided an interesting sequel to the Agadir crisis.

During

the crisis, Kiderlen had practically a free hand in diplo
macy;

the Chancellor worked behind the scenes and generally

supported his Secretary.

But Kiderlen found himself prac

tically excluded from participation in the Haldane talks.
Could it be that the Kaiser’s prediction had come true, that
Bethmann finally found Kidhrlen’s methods to be too abrupt?
Bethmann does not answer this question in his memoirs.

CHAPTER

III

BETHMAM AND THE HAIDANE MISSION
How did the 19II Morocco crisis affect Germany's
diplomatic situation?

In the German government, we find

again the two competing interpretations.

The Chancellor and

the Poreign Office defended the view that Germany had clear
ed an obstacle from her diplomatic path, and that the ad
justment was both politically and territorially favourable.
In Admiralty circles, quite a different interpretation be
came current.

Navy Secretary Tirpitz, the main exponent of

this line, thought that Germany had received an echec from
England and Prance, which must be countered by a stiffening
©f the military posture if Germany wished to remain a "great
power.The

current anti-British sentiments of press and

public opinion seemed very convenient for this purpose.
"If it turns out that we have received a diplomatic setback,"
wrote Tirpitz to his immediate subordinate, "there will be
a violent public indignation.
2
thereby be increased."

The chances of a Novelle will

It was an easy matter for the Admiral to convince William

^Tirpitz, Aufbau, pp. 199ff*
p
Ibid., p. 200, In this case, the term Novelle refers
to an amendment of or supplement to the existing navy law,
a law which governed the rate of shipbuilding of and finan
cial allotments to the German navy.
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II, in whom the Morocco crisis had awakened resentment against
Prance and England,

The Emperor thought it a pity not to

make use of the existing feeling in Germany to secure a
naval increase from the Reichstag; at other times, that body
could he so inconveniently parsimonious.

On August 27, the

Emperor began to prepare the ground by hinting in a banquet
3
address that he favoured an expansion of the German fleet.
The press immediately took up this statement;

throughout

Germany it was taken as an indication that a Novelle was
necessary.

He told the Chancellor that the important con

siderations were the atmosphere of disillusionment in Germany
and the German loss of prestige abroad, both brought about
by the unfortunate course of the Moroccan affair.
fleet increase could remedy the situation.
a plan

Only a

Tirpitz outlined

an increase in the present naval construction

plans of six capital ships over a period of six years.

In

addition, there were to be increases in various other naval
armaments, of a nature designed to enhance the fighting
4
efficiency of the navy.
Since the Admiral justified the
increase with an interpretation of the Moroccan crisis direct-

^D. G. P.. XXXI, #11307.

Editors’ footnote,

pp. 3-5.

^Tirpitz, Aufbau, pp. 208ff. During the ilnglo-German
controntation triggered by the Morocco crisis, a practice
concentration of the British Navy had prompted German counter
movements, during which the Admirals had discovered serious
manpower and supply deficiencies. These were to be remedied
by the Novelle. Walther Hubatsch, Die Aera Tirpitz, (Goettingen,
1955) p. 90.
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ly opposed to Bethmann’s, the latter could not have been very
favourably impressed.

He made no immediate reply, but on

receipt of a memorandum from the Admiral on August 30, he
consulted the Foreign Office on the question, whereupon he
made objections on two groundsî

that such a Novelle would

increase the danger of war with Great Britain, and that the
existing tax structure could not support the additional
financial burden.

He and Tirpitz agreed to wait until the

conclusion of the Pranco-German Morocco talks.^
On September 26, on the occasion of his annual report
to the Emperor, Tirpitz again presented his views of the
diplomatic situation and of the German navy’s role in world
politics.

The significance of the report is that Tirpitz

advocated a new strategy of naval construction.

Previously,

he had defended the ’’risk” concept, which called for a German
navy of such strength that, if the British navy engaged it in
all-out battle, Great Britain’s great-power status relative
to other naval powers would be endangered.

Now he desired a

fleet which would have at least a ’’defensive chance” of
victory against the British fleet.

Such a strategy required

a three-to-two ratio in the capital ships of the two navies.
He saw two alternatives for the achievement of this ratio;

Tirpitz, Aufbau. p. 209. Tirpitz here used the in
cident to develop the impression of Bethmann’s weakness and
indecision by picturing him as grasping with evident relief
for this temporary respite.
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a mutual construction limitation to conform to the formula,
or an independent German program to close the gap regardless
of Great Britain's plans.

Tirpitz claimed to prefer the

first alternative, hut his language betrays that he did not
consider it to be the likely one.

Both alternatives would

permit the passage of the Novelle which he contemplated.
any rate, Germany

At

could publicly offer the two-to-three

ratio to Great Britain, thereby placing the "onus of re
jection" on that nation,^
The Admiral's plan evidently made a most favourable
impression on William II, who immediately wrote the Chancellor
in support of the idea.

At this time, he still admitted

the gravity of Bethmann's objections and promised to keep
them in mind.

Four days later, he sent the Chancellor another

letter on the same subject, but this time he adopted the
Tirpitz plan as his own personal solution, and relegated
the Admiral to the role of an enthusiastic supporter of the
7

Imperial idea.

Since Bethmann knew who had originated the

idea, he must have realized that William II's adoption of it
as his own was the strongest form of support for a Novelle.
On November 11, the Emperor directed him to discuss the plan
with Tirpitz, who, he claimed, had already been "acquainted

Glbid,,

pp, 215-15.

?Ibid,,

pp. 217-18.
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with its outlines.”®
The discussion took place as directed on November 16.^
According to Tirpitz, the Chancellor agreed to accept a
formal proposal of the expansion plan which should be in
corporated into the 1912 navy estimates.

The compilation

of these estimates was to be retarded long enough to permit
this inclusion.

But Bethmann made it clear that his agree

ment to accept the proposal did not indicate personal ap
proval of the plan;

on the contrary, he reserved the right

to withhold his support from it in the Reichstag debates.
Tirpitz interpreted this to mean that Bethmann might resign
rather than support this aspect of the Emperor’s policy, if
the Emperor pressed him on the issue.
was substantially correct.

This interpretation

Fleet expansion so obviously

contradicted the Chancellor’s goals in foreign policy that
he could not support it under any circumstances. Meanwhile,
he contemplated no resignation, but vigorous political
resistance.
The internal struggle which resulted from Bethmann*s
decision was another contest between the civilian and the
military interpretations of Anglo-German relations.

Part

of the reason for the bitterness of the struggle was the
fact that each side had its own representatives in ïhgland.

®D. G. P .,

XXXI, #11319, pp. 28-9.

^Tirpitz, Aufbau, pp. 257-8.
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Almost every report from Ambassador Mettemich stressed the
danger to ikiglo-Genaan relations of a Novelle such as was
then contemplated.

In fact, Mettemich felt obliged to

repeat this warning so often that it caused him some em
barrassment,

Bethmann and Kiderlen fully accepted his in

terpretation,

The Chancellor had by no means given up his

plan to bring about a rannrochement between the two countries,
but, as he explained to Mettemich on November 22, the
Emperor was so strongly determined on a Novelle that he
might even accept a change in Chancellors to secure its
passage.

10

He saw only one way to avoid the naval expansion

and the consequent deterioration of Anglo-German relations:
The government can withstand the pressure for pre
sentation of a supplementary navy law, and likely for
an army increase, only if Ihgland decides to work for
a positive understanding with us, and proves this
decision with actions.,.,I can convince His Majesty of
the inopportunity of the Novelle only if the English
government actually negotiates with us on the subject
of a political understanding. Otherwise, His Majesty,
as well as our public, will see in England's friendly
assurances only an attempt to lull us to sleep for the
moment, and thus to prevent our fleet increases,
Mettemich thought he could discern a change in the
British attitude towards Germany following the Morocco
crisis.

The nearness of war and the disclosure of Great

Britain's commitments to France had convinced many people
that Anglo-German relations must be improved.

lOp , G, P . , X X n , #11321.

pp, 3 1 -3 .

In particular.
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there was an outcry against the policies of Sir Edward Grey.
Mettemich told his Chancellor that opportunities for nego
tiations seemed excellent, but that any naval expansion at
the present time would certainly wreck these opportunities.
The Naval Attache, Captain Wilhelm Widenmann, made a
very similar estimate of the English mood.

He also recog

nized a reaction against the diplomacy of Sir Edward Grey
and a desire to avoid further crises which could lead to a
European war.

Yet he interpreted this mood in a peculiarly

military manner;

it meant to him only that the German fleet

expansion could proceed at this time without fear of British
countermeasures.

The same atmosphere which suggested to

the diplomats the possibility of and need for negotiations,
meant to the military an opportunity to increase armaments.
Bethmann used Mettemich's reports to develop his case;
Tirpitz used those of Widenmann.

11

It was a question of

which interpretation would gain favour with William. II.
The Emperor's choice was unambiguous, as the following
example shows:

in a despatch to Bethmannn prompted by a

particularly disagreeable Attache report, Mettemich count-

11

The naval Attaché could not be directly controlled
by the civilian government. He made his reports not to
the Ambassador, but to the Secretary of the Navy, who also
issued his instructions. He had almost the position of an
ambassador for the naval expansion party. Jaeckh,
Kiderlen-Waechter, II, pp. 85-6.
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ered Widenmann's position on every p o i n t . T o the Attache’s
conclusion that the fleet should he expanded now to exclude
the possibility of a *•Copenhagen” in the future, he opposed
his own conclusion that the Novelle was a step towards war.
The Emperor decorated the Ambassador's report with twentynine sarcastic comments.

"Twaddle and nonsense," he wrote,

"I agree entirely with the Attaché."
he labelled;

Widenmann*s report

"outstanding,"^^

The conviction that the Novelle would seriously impair
Anglo-German relations led Bethmann to use every available
political pressure to prevent, delay or reduce the contem
plated expansion in order to gain time to initiate another
series of talks with Great Britain.

Once the talks were in

progress, he thought, the chance of their success would
give him a lever of influence with the Emperor.

He suggest

ed to the army chiefs that an expansion of the army's
capacity was far more necessary than a new navy law,^^
The army chiefs took the hint and put forward proposals of
their own, which they based on the argument that the army,
being more directly responsible for the safety of the

12p. G. P ., x m , #11314, 11316, pp. 15-7, 18-20,
and marginal notations.
I^Gaptain Widenmann was aware of his Emperor's feelings
and used his position of favour to intrigue against Metternich, even to the point of accusing him of being amenable to
influences from the British Admiralty. Tirpitz, Aufbau, p. 250,
14ibid.;.p. 266.
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Fatherland, had prior claim to expansion.

15

Bethmann asked

the Prussian War Minister, Josias von Heeringen, to defend
this position vigorously in connection with the Novelle.
On November 18, the Imperial Treasury Secretary Adolf
Wermuth, a close collaborator of the Chancellor, rebelled
against the planned double load on finances.

Admiral

Tirpitz was probably correct in the assumption that Bethmann
17
himself instigated the revolt.
Ten days later, Wermuth
sent Tirpitz a long memorandum explaining that the present
tax structure could not support the load of both army and
navy

i

n

c

r

e

a

s

e

s

.

the same day Bethmann informed the

Admiral that the Novelle could not be included in the 1912
Navy estimates as previously planned, but must stand alone,
since it was now not only a question of naval increase, but
of a general increase in armaments.

Furthermore, a debate

on the measures in the upper house must await the Bmperor's
19
decision on the question of new taxes.

15

^Friedrich Haselmayr, Diplomatische Geschichte des
Zweiten Reichs von 1871 bis 1918% (Muen'chen, 1963) VI,
i, p. 150.
1A
Graf Westarp, Konservative Politik im letzten Jahrzehnt
des Kaiserreiohes. (Eerlin, 1935) I, p. &24.
1?Tirpitz, Aufbau, pp. 227, 258-59» 278-79. It later
became evident that the reason was spurious, that here was
sufficient surplus on hand to finance the Novelle without
more taxes.
IGp. G. P ., XXXI, #11324. pp. 35-43.
^^Haselmayr, Geschichte,
p. 261.

VI, i, p. 150.

Tirpitz, Aufbau.
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Under this onslaught, Tirpitz remained intransigent
until Wermuth tendered his resignation.

In view of the

impending Reichstag elections, this could have had serious
consequences for the government’s working arrangement in that
assembly.

Tirpitz had no choice but to compromise;

he

consented to a reduction in the Novelle from six to three
capital ships in the same time period.
Emperor approved the reduced Novelle.

On January 25, the
As a further concession

to Bethmann’s ’’conspirators,” the throne speech in the new
Reichstag on February 7 made only general references to a
fleet increase, without giving any details.
This was a political triumph for Bethmann, but at the
same time it illustrated his lack of willpower in opposition
to the Navy Secretary and the Emperor.

He had managed to

cut the Novelle’s shipbuilding program in half, and he had
at least kept open the possibility of a further reduction.
But even this reduced Novelle was, in his personal judgment,
a mistake.

He did not resign because he feared that he

would be succeeded by an open supporter of naval expansion,
perhaps even by Tirpitz.

Thus, he began the compromise

practice of reluctantly carrying out a policy which he per
sonally thought wrong.

Similarly, he agreed to include the

announcement of navy increases in the throne speech on the
very eve of lord Haldane’s visit to Berlin, though he must
have realized what effect that would have on his freedom of

84.
negotiation.

20

While the Haldane mission originated directly from an
intercession by private persons, it was made possible by an
officially cultivated climate of reconciliation which became
effective in the autumn of 1911.

On the German side, Bethmann

and Mettemich worked for a resumption of mglo-German nego
tiations, whereby they hoped to prevent a sharpening of the
naval rivalry.

The Chancellor thought the situation ripe

for a general understanding, and directed his Ambassador to
explore the possibilities in that direction.
demurred;

21

Mettemich

he explained that only a colonial settlement

seemed possible at the moment, and an attempt to gain a
general understanding would only make the British government
suspicious.

Though he would carry out the instructions if
22
Bethmann insisted, he felt obliged to point this out.
Bethmann had complete confidence in the Ambassador (a con
fidence which his Emperor certainly did not share^^), and

he permitted him to approach Sir Edward Grey in the manner
he thought best.

The resulting interview revealed no

^Ogee the interpretation of Heinrich Friedjung, Das
Zeitalter des Imperialismus. (Berlin, 1922) III, pp. 9 S f f .
G. P.,

xm,

Ibid., x m ,

#11341,

#11342,

pp. 78-80.

pp. 81-82.

^^See for example his marginal notation. Ibid.,
#11344, p. 86.
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startling change of attitude on Grey’s part, but Mettemich
thought him well-disposed to a reopening of negotiations,
Mettemich*s temporary substitute, Richard von Kuehlmann,
came to the same conclusion, and reported it to Bethmann on
January 8.^4

Thus, it seems likely that the Chancellor

would eventually have initiated another series of m g l o German talks.

In view of Mettemich’s scruples, these talks

would have been on a very limited basis, and consequently
would have had a fair chance of success.
The talks were actually resumed on the occasion of
Lord Haldane's visit to Berlin, through the arrangement of
two international businessmen. Sir Emest Cassel and Albert
Ballin.

The manner in which they went about their voluntary

mediation led to misunderstanding from the start, for each
government believed that the other had taken the first
official step.

Apparently Albert Ballin made the first move,

asking Sir Emest Cassel to approach the First Lord of the
Admiralty, Winston Churchill, with an offer to mediate be
tween him and the German Emperor, and, if possible, to
25
arrange for him to meet Tirpitz.
Churchill, who thought
the offer had emanated from the German Etaperor, declined to

24ibid., XXXI, #11345, pp. 87-92. This report irritated
William II to such a degree that he drafted a note, in his
own hand, to inform Kuehlmann of the wrongheadedness of his
concepts of the British situation.
^^Ibid., XXI, #11347.

Editors' footnote,

pp. 97-98.
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visit Berlin, but declared himself in favour of negotiations.
Together with Lloyd George and Sir Edward Grey, he prepared
a memorandum in answer to the supposed German suggestion.
On January 29» Sir Ernest Cassel delivered the "answer" to
William II, in the presence of Ballin and Bethmann.

In

Bathmann’s accurate summary, it proposed
...acceptance of English superiority at sea— no augmen?
tation of the German naval programme— a reduction as
far as possible of this programme— and, on the part of
England, no impediment to our colonial expansion—
discussion and promotion of our colonial ambitions—
proposals for mutual declarations that the two powers
would not take part ^ agressive plans and combinations
against one another.^'
The memorandum contained nothing which had not been
the subject of discussion before, but the Emperor received
it with an enthusiasm and a sense of triumph which is
difficult to explain.

He interpreted the contents as "a

formal neutrality proposal for the event of German involve
ment in war, dependent on certain cutbacks in the area of
28
naval construction."
Such an interpretation was possible
only from the viewpoint of the Widenmann-Tirpitz assumption
that Great Britain found it nearly impossible to compete
financially with Germany's naval construction, and desperate-

Bernhard Huldermann, Gilbert Ballin. (London, 1922)
pp. 246ff. Grey, Twenty-Eive Years, I pp. 250ff.
Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, Reflections on the
World War. (London, 1919) pp. 48-9.
2®Wilhelm II, Leutscher Kaiser, Ereignisse und Gestalten
aus den Jahren 1878-1918. (Leipzig, 1922) pp. 122ff.
"
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ly nSeded a respite.

In this light, the memorandum appeared

simply as further proof of England's desperation;

it is not

surprising that William II thought he could exploit the
British offer.

Almost immediately he set down an answer

in his own hand, accepting the British basis with the pro
viso that the ITovelle, which was then in preparation, should
remain intact.

?Q

Bethmann thereupon gave a brief sketch of

the Novelle to Oassel, who believed that the British govern
ment would accept the German proviso.
Bethmann shared neither his Emperor’s enthusiasm nor
his surprise at the contents of the British memorandum though
he was probably surprised by the Emperor's reaction.

Since

he was also under the impression that the British government
had taken the first step, he believed that the German proviso
would be accepted.

He was soon set straight by his ilmbassador,

who saw no chance of a change of British policy in the direc
tion outlined in the memorandum if Germany insisted on the
30
Novelle.
The British answer gave convincing proof of this.
While the spirit of the German reply was "cordially appre
ciated" in England, the German naval programme caused great

^ihid., pp. 124ff. In his memoirs, he claimed that
Bethmann, Cassel, and Ballin helped him to compose the answer,
that he was only the recorder in a group of equals. Prom the
contents, it seems to be mostly his own work.
5®Bethmann's original optimism, D. G. P., XXXI, #11348,
pp. 99-100.

88.

31
concem.

The British government was prepared to negotiate

.if... German naval expenditure can be adapted by an alter
ation of the tempo or otherwise so as to render any serious
increase unnecessary to meet the German programme."

On that

assumption, Haldane, the War Minister, would come to Berlin
for an unofficial exploration of the ground for negotiations.
Bethmann knew that William II was intransigent on jurt
that point— that, in other words, there was no basis for the
negotiations.

Yet he replied on February 4 that Britain's

wishes in the area of naval construction could be accomodated
32
in exchange for equivalent political guarantees.
Ironical
ly, William II annotated the German copy of this reply with
guidelines which directly contradicted Bethmann's offer.

He

ordered negotiations "for the time being" on the basis of
retention of the Hovelle.

Later, under the Navy Secretary's

influence, the provisional decision for retention became
33
absolute.
The same day, Bethmann wrote to Mettemich
explaining the steps he had taken.

He believed there was

"not the slightest chance" that Sir Edward Grey could accept
the German basis for the talks, though he hoped that a
Liberal cabinet from which Grey was excluded might take up

^Ifbid., XXXI, #11350.

Editors' footnote,

pp. 102-3.

52lbid.. XXXI, #11351, pp. 103-4.
S^Ibid., XXXI, #11357,
110.

Editors' footnote,

pp. 109-
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the o f f e r . G r e y ' s exclusion seemed possible in view of
recent severe criticism of his foreign policy.
bassador had to dispel this hope;

The ilm-

Grey's departure, he

said, could not be expected, for he had the solid support of
Haldane, Prime Minister Herbert Henry Asquith, and Churchill.
The German basis would, however, be accepted on the assump
tion that Bethmann's answer implied a possible dropping of
the Hovelle. Mettemich personally did not believe in this
possibility, and called the situation a "vicious circle."
Of the British and German officials connected with this
preliminary to the Haldane mission, only Mettemich and Beth
mann were in a position to appreciate the colossal misunder
standing, to note that the two parties were approaching the
talks with contradictory purposes.

Bethmann alone realized

that the Emperor's whole conception of the affair was a
dangerous delusion, yet he took no steps to set him straight.
Clearly, he was directly responsible for initiating talks
for which there was no common point of origin.
action for a moralist like Bethmanni

A strange

His purpose becomes

somewhat clearer from his attempt to keep possible sources
of trouble uniformed until the government was committed.
Tirpitz, for example, heard of the plans on February 5, the

34ibid., x m ,

#11353, pp. 105-6.

3^Ibid., XXXI, #11354, p. 107.
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day after Bethmann sent his accomodating a n s w e r , T h e
Admiral was somewhat indignant, and considered this as a
fait accompli designed to exclude his objections.

"If I

had been consulted," he told Bethmann, "I would never have
approved of this unofficial procedure of initiating negotia
tions through international businessmen."

Tirpitz knew

immediately that his Novelle was in danger, but the Chancellor
assured him that it would be mentioned in the throne speech
as planned.

In the Admiral’s opinion, Bethmann was now

unsure of himself, and began to doubt the wisdom of his
action.

"He realized that hesitation

at this point might

be dangerous."
Kiderlen played a very minor role in all phases of the
Haldane negotiations, and Haldane got the impression that
it was the Chancellor's intention to keep him out of the
talks as much as possible.
clear;

37

The reason for this is not

either Bethmann no longer trusted Kiderlen after

his handling of the Morocco crisis, or he feared that the
realistic Kiderlen would disapprove of the initiation of
talks on a basis which offered little chance for settlement,
but a great possibility of further misunderstanding and
annoyance.
What did Bethmann hopeto gain from this deliberate

^^Tirpitz, Aufbau, pp. 280-83.
^^B. D. D ., VI, #506,

Haldane's dairy, pp. 676-85.
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gamble?

Apparently he was conscious of his inability to

force his decisions over the objections of the Emperor and
the Navy Secretary.

Yet he was unwilling to resign in pro

test, so he decided to place both Tirpitz and William II
before a fait accompli.

If Haldane seemed inclined to

discuss a far-reaching political agreement, Bethmann could
use this fact to pry naval concessions from William II.
In his Reflections, he indicated that he simply did not
accept the latter's decision to maintain the Novelle, but
continued to work for its r e d u c t i o n . B u t to achieve this,
he had to bring Haldane to Berlin, even if this could only
be done by a misrepresentation of the Emperor's directives,
A man of bolder nature, in Bethmann's position, would no
doubt have handed in his resignation.

The Chancellor took

no such demonstrative action, but he still resisted with
great persistence and ingenuity this naval policy which he
thought wrong.

What was fatal to his undertaking was the

fact that he did not negotiate alone, but in conjunction
with the Emperor and the Navy Secretary.

Under those cir

cumstances, it was impossible to hide the lack of unity in
the German government.
The Chancellor believed that there was a middle ground
on which Great Britain and Germany could settle their differ
ences with approximately equal concessions.

In his earlier

Bethmann Hollweg, Reflections. I, p. 54.
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efforts, he had sought that middle ground in a formula of
this sort*

Germany concedes a certain reduction in her

planned naval construction, in return for which Great Britain
promises neutrality if Germany becomes involved in a war on
the Continent;

this provision to be reciprocal and not to

take effect in the event of aggression by the parties to the
agreement.

In the past, the policies of both governments

had prevented a meeting on this ground.

German authorities

clung to their right to naval expansion;

the British scur

ried for cover whenever the Entente seemed in danger, and
Prance and Russia saw to it that this was often the case.
In the talks with Haldane, Bethmann was even more
restricted than he had hitherto been.

Willaim II desired

to retain the Hove lie and to gain a definite neutrality
agreement for Germany, but he mentioned no concessions.

39

On Haldane’s part, there was a similarly restricting in
struction.

The British Cabinet directed him to negotiate

only on the basis of absolute loyalty to the Entente.
This meant that he could give assurances of friendliness,
and he could offer various parcels of colonial real estate.
If a war actually broke out in spite of Britain's peaceful
intentions, of which she was willing to give assurances,
then Great Britain would be on Prance's side, regardless

^^Tirpitz, Aufbau. pp. 238-40. D. G. P .. XXXI, #11351,
pp. 103-4. Williain II 's annotations.
^^Richard Burton Haldane, Before the War. (London, 1920)
p. 108.
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who was the aggressor.

The fact that Bethmann and Haldane

found it possible to agree on a political formula must be
attributed to their fervent desire for success, which
prompted them to exceed their instructions.
They met immediately on Haldane's arrival in Berlin,
on February 8 .

Both negotiators confined themselves in this

initial meeting to general explorations.^^

Haldane spent

some time convincing Bethmann that Great Britain had no
secret agreements with France and Russia.

The Chancellor

assured his guest that Germany did not intend to "fall
upon France" as soon as Great Britain's neutrality was assur
ed.

When he went on to propose a neutrality agreement,

Haldane illustrated the interpretational difficulties of
this, suggesting instead a mutual undertaking in which the
parties should assure each other that they had no aggressive
intentions.

Bethmann was not impressed, but he promised to

consider the matter.

On his part, he dutifully defended

the German intention to form a third active squadron, and
he thought he had convinced Haldane of this necessity.
That was not the main point of contention, said Haldane.
Great Britain's alarm stemmed not from the third squadron
proposal, but from the increase in Dreadnought construction

B. D. P ., VI, #506, pp. 676-85. Haldane's Diary.
Bethmann Hollweg, Reflections. I, pp. 49-53. Viscount
Haldane, Before the War, pp. 57-9.
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which would accompany its formation.
there was more agreement;

On the colonial question,

Haldane outlined areas Great Britain

might consider suitable for German expansion.

In exchange,

Bethmann assured him of German concessions regarding the
Bagdhad Railway.

The negotiators gained the most favourable

impressions of each other;

Haldane was convinced that Beth

mann would do his best to overcome difficulties in other
departments of the German government.
In his first talk with the Chancellor, Haldane adhered
scrupulously to the limitations placed on him by the ex
ploratory nature of his mission.

Next day, his conversations

with Tirpitz and William II departed markedly from this
pattern, although Haldane stated at the outset that he was
not an official n e g o t i a t o r . T h e Emperor began by explain
ing that the present format of his Novelle was much reduced
from its original form, that this in itself was a concession.
But Haldane insisted that even this "reduced” tempo repre
sented an increase in construction of capital ships, which
could not be combined with a political understanding.

There

upon, William II and Tirpitz offered a postponement in the
construction of Novelle ships from 1912-14-16 to 1913-16-19,
which Haldane considered an improvement;

in the Emperor's

opinion, he had declared himself satisfied.

42 B. B. D., VI, #506, p. 679.

Finally, they

Tirpitz, Aufbau, pp. 286-9.
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decided to go ahead with the political agreement alone;
upon publication of such an agreement the Emperor could
announce the modified naval construction arrangement.
The Navy Secretary and the Emperor made no allowance
for the limited authorization of their guest and opened
certain lines of discussion which had no place in a prelim"_
nary

exploration.

Bethmann had specifically warned Tirpitz

not to propose his two-to-three ratio, but the Admiral saw
fit to propose just that, though Haldane quickly disposed of
it.^^

Near the end of the discussion, William II gave

Haldane a detailed copy of the planned Novelle, evidently
in the hope that the latter would quickly glance at the
document and give it his blessing.

Haldane, however, simply

put it in his pocket, explaining that technical navy matters
would be checked by the A d m i r a l t y . W i l l i a m II immediately
informed the Chancellor of his '*success," and this report
indicates the extent of his misinterpretation of Haldane's
45
role.
He spoke of an "accepted" basis and of confidently
expected actions of the British government:

for him,

Haldane had become an official negotiator for the British
cabinet.

He thought the matter was practically settled.

45Tirpitz, Aufbau, p. 293.
pp. 109-10. Editors' footnote.
G. P..
#506, p:' 6B0.

D. G. P.. XXXI, #11357,

XXXI. #11380. vv. 145-48.

45p. G. P.. XXXI, #11359, pp. 112-14.

B. D. D., VI,
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Bethmann and Haldane could not regard William II’s
ham-handed interference as a success,

Haldane confessed

to Sir Edward Goschen that he was appalled;

toward the end

of the talk, he had tried to put on a cheerful face because
he hoped to accomplish more with the Chancellor;

this,

Tirpitz and the Emperor had taken for an expression of
satisfaction with the results o b t a i n e d . W h e n he met the
Chancellor next day, Haldane found him also in a disturbed
mood.

47

The Chancellor sought to impress on Haldane once

more that a complete British rejection of the Novelle would
end the negotiations.

He certainly did not regard the

Emperor's proposals as "accepted,"
The next day, however, Bethmann's pessimism disappeared
entirely, for, contrary to expectations, he and Haldane
worked out a mutually satisfactory political understanding.

48

In its final form, the understanding retained the British
offer of assurances against unprovoked attack and aggressive
design.

To this it added a neutrality agreement in the event

of a war in which the contracting party was not an aggressor,
a clause which Bethmann particularly d e s i r e d . W h e n

4&B. D. P., VI, #504, pp. 674-75.
47lbid., VI, #506, p. 681,
G, P,, XXXI, #11362. PT). 117-20,
#506, p, 681,

B. D. D., VI,

^^Bethmann's original version, Haldane's changes and tb<
final version, see D, G, P., XXXI, #11362, pp, 117-20.
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Haldane sought to bring up the question of the Hovello,
Bethmann avoided the issue on the grounds that it was a
technical question which he was not competent to discuss.
He hinted, however, that a strong political agreement would
give him leverage to reduce the construction programme.

The

document ended with a statement of each country's concessions
and desires on the colonial and Bagdhad Railway questions.
This last meeting convinced the Chancellor that the
preliminary talks would lead to successful negotiations.
Thus, when Mettemich reported on February 12 that a complete
surrender of the Novelle might become necessary, he replied,
50
rather indignantly, that he could not agree at all.
He
explained his standpoint as follows:
Haldane has admitted here the necessity of a fleet
Novelle. He realized that, without a third active
squadron, we have no fleet at all for two or three
months every year...Haldane therefore directed his
requests not to the complete deletion of the Novelle,
but to the question of increased Dreadnought construc
tion. The deletion of the Dreadnoughts is at present
the only question which is under consideration. Whether
or not we can go that far, I cannot say at present.
Should England desire this, the chances of our acceptance
will depend on the scope of the political agreement.
The Chancellor's position on the Novelle becomes clear:
he intended to remove the Dreadnoughts, if possible, and to
pass it through the Reichstag simply as a measure designed
to increase the efficiency of the existing forces;

the fact

50p. G. P .. XXXI, #11367, pp. 122-23. Mettemich's.
report as annotated by Bethmann. #11368, pp. 123-24.
Bethmann's reply to Mettemich's report.
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that these would now he organized in three instead of two
active squadrons did not cause him concern;

he expected no

British objections so long as the construction of capital
ships was not effected.

But he knew that Tirpitz and his

followers would put up a stiff .resistance to any such at
tempt to render the ITovelle harmless.

In the interval be

tween Haldane’s departure and the communication of the
British reaction, Bethmann made two preliminary advances
against the naval construction party.

First, he sought

to muzzle Widenmann, the troublesome Naval Attaché in
London.

On a recent occasion, the latter had spoken to a

British Admiral about the desire of German ’’political
circles” (Politik) to establish the two-to-three ratio
in the navies of the two countries.

Bethmann’s request to

the Navy Secretary not to discuss such a plan had been
ignored, but this was a different matter;

an Attaché

could simply be ordered to refrain from such discussion.
The Chancellor reported the incident to William II, and
asked permission to reprimand Widenmann.

After all.

Attachés could not be permitted to contradict the official
position of the government.’
tion in a diferent light*

But the Emperor saw the situa

Widenmann’s conversation with

the British Admiral was not official;

they had merely dis

cussed ’’what was a common topic of conversation in naval
circles."

Furthermore, a naval officer could not be re-

99.
primanded by a mere civilian,

but only by his ’’Highest

Warlord,” and the "Warlord” did not see fit to reprimand
him.^ ^
Shortly after this Imperial rebuff, the Chancellor
evidently began to doubt the British acceptance of the
political agreement, and decided he might after all need
the concession of Novelle battleships as a lever with
England.

In preparation for that eventuality, he sent

Kiderlen to the Admiralty to acquaint Tirpitz with this
possibility.

Tirpitz emphatically declined even to consid

er the idea, and he informed the Emperor of Kiderlen's
52
proposal.
This made it Kiderlen’s turn to be enlightened
by the Imperial schoolmaster:

since Haldane’s departure

nothing had come to his notice to warrant the conclusion
that the capital ships of the Novelle needed to be sacri
ficed to gain an agreement.55
I cannot understand how your Excellency can come
to such a conclusion. Your Excellency must be in
possession of new information, probably from a private

^^Tirpitz, Aufbau.

pp. 295-94.

5^Ibid.. pp. 290-91.
55Kiderlen did not accept the reprimand without comment,
but answered in an equally sarcastic letter (with ridiculous
over-deference to His Imperial Majesty) explaining that he
had merely tried to inform the Navy Secretary of the feel
ings of the Foreign Affairs Department. This serves to
illustrate the difference in personalities of Kiderlen and
Bethmann. The latter quietly accepted the Imperial dis
pleasure. Jaeckh, Kiderlen-Waechter, II, pp. 157-58.
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source. I venture to remind your Excellency that, on
the specific request of the Chancellor, I have personally taken a hand in the negotiations— apparently not
without success— and I have the intention to continue
to do so...I order, therefore, that any additional
information in your possession be communicated to me
at once.
The two incidents resulted only in an indication of
the strength of Tirpitz*s influence on the Imperor, and
the strength of their determination to realize the fleet
increase.

Expectations of successful negotiations must have
been high in the governments of both countries following
Haldane’s return to England.

Sir Edward Grey expressed his

personal satisfaction to Mettemich;

this in itself may

not be very significant, but Prime Minister Asquith expressed
similar sentiments in the House of Commons, much to the
satisfaction of the members.

In Germany, Bethmann made
54
analogous announcements in the Reichstag.
Such public
announcements are not lightly made, and certainly not if
it is expected that they will be contradicted by events.
Since the proposed political agreement could be evaluated
at a glance, the British cabinet must at least have believed
that further negotiations were possible on that basis.

54p. G. P .,XXXI. #11565, 11569 pp. 121, 124-28, and
Editors' footnote. Haselmayer, Geschichte, VI, i , p. 172.
^^Sir Arthur Nicolson had immediately prepared a critique
which proposed radical changes, but did not entirely reject
the political agreement. Yet he was probably the most antiGerman Foreign Office employee. B. E. P., VI, #507, p. 686.
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It is therefore likely that the crucial factor was the
copy of the Novelle which the Emperor had so generously
(and voluntarily) supplied.

It required scrutiny, and the

Admiralty’s objections were certainly not immediately
available.

That detailed study revealed increases in the

size and fighting efficiency of the German navy in addition
to the increase in the number of Dreadnoughts, and on
that basis, the political agreement, in which Haldane had
at any rate overstepped his bounds somewhat, seemed a totally
one-sided concession on the part of Great Britain.

The

original optimism thus appeared unwarranted.
The about-turn came ten days after the first reaction.

56

Grey and Haldane told Mettemich that the German naval pro
gramme called for a sizable expansion in personnel, which
led them to believe that new units, in addition to the
announced third squadron, would be formed in the near future.
The construction of smaller vessels was to be similarly
over-expanded.

In consequence, Great Britain would be

required to undertake large additional expenditures, and
public opinion would under those circumstances refuse to
permit far-reaching political agreements.

Two days later,

Mettemich received a memorandum setting down the Admiralty's
calculation;

on that occasion. Sir Edward Grey doubted if

all the colonial territories Haldane had mentioned could

5Gp. G. P .. XXXE, #11570, pp. 128-50.
#506, p. 679.

B. D. P .. VI,
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be given in exchange for much smaller Bagdhad Railway con
ey
cessions.
Moreover, certain international legal complica
tions had appeared.

While these were not vital objections,

the planned Novelle was an extremely serious one.

If that

main problem could be solved, the others would not present
great difficulties.

The two conversations amounted to a

complete rejection of the tentative basis established by
Haldane.
Bethmann was disappointed, but not surprised.

After

all, Mettemich had warned him of just such a possibility.
The Chancellor had at first rejected the w a m i n - , but
later he sought to prepare the ground for further German
concessions, so the possibility of a British rejection
must have occured to him.

The failure of this attempt to

prepare for further German concession left him only one
futile courses

to stand firm for the time being on the

Haldane basis.

Accordingly, he prepared a memorandum which

carefully illustrated the British abandonment of the original
basis:
England drops part of her colonial offer, is complete
ly silent on the question of the political agreement,
criticises our increase of personnell and submarines
despite our concessions in the rate of naval construc
tion. We must see in this a complete disavowal of
Haldane. We are nevertheless still ready for a politi
cal agreement on the Haldane basis, and we will gladly

57p. G. P ., XXXI, #11373, pp. 132-34.
71, #524, pp. 697-98.

Anlage.
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discuss English proposals in this

a r e a . 58

The Chancellor's conception of Haldane's role had
never been unrealistic, and, as is evident from this state
ment, the British disavowal of the exploratory talks did not
in his opinion preclude further negotiations.

Indeed, he

continued to agitate against the Novelle, though he official59
ly supported its parliamentary passage.
However, the
Emperor's over-expectation now produced a violent over
reaction.

In fact, had not Bethmann and the Foreign Office

put the damper on him, he would have plunged Europe into
a crisis in order to appease his injured pride.

Fortunate

ly, his more questionable orders were simply not obeyed.
This is not to imply that he habitually ■ gave rein to his
temper;

on the contrary, he had been somewhat subdued

since the Daily Telegraph incident of the Buelow days.
While his language still tended to be somewhat "picturesque"
on occasion, his public statements and his actions were
generally carefully considered.
case:

But this was a special

he had personally taken a hand in diplomacy, and he

flattered himself that such Imperial intervention accomplished
much more than similar action by ordinary m o r t a l s . I t was

g. p.. XXXI, #11376, pp. 140-41.
^^Tirpitz, Aufbau, pp. 313-14.
^^Seo the dispatch to Kiderlen for his own estimate of
the effectiveness of his intervention. Jaeckh, KiderlenWaechter, II, pp. 155-57.
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not Haldane’s disavowal or the change in the basis of nego
tiations that mattered;

he felt personally slighted.

As usual, he vented his initial fury against Metternich's
report;

"Haldane and I are totally disavowed," he noted

in the margin.
This is an insolent intervention in the sovereignty
of a great nation, and into the decisions of her high
est War Lord. That is not negotation, but blackmail,
and the delivery of sommations I I will not become in
volved in anything of that sorti^^
He concluded his note with directions for Bethmann to proceed
immediately with a detailed description of the Novelle in
the Reichstag, so that it could be used to "soothe the
worries and fears of the German people."
this instruction.

Bethmann ignored

Next, William II directed Kiderlen to

reprimand Ambassador Mettemich for accepting and forward
ing such a document.

Kiderlen also ignored this,^^

A greater shock awaited the Emperor:

on March 4,

Mettemich reported a conversation with Haldane.

The

cabinet had decided that, depending on the size of the
Novelle when actually passed, the Mediterranean fleet could
be recalled to the North Sea to meet the increase of German
f:rz

naval power!

Judging from the structure of his marginal

Glp. G. P ., XXXI, #11374, pp. 135-36.
and summarizing notations.
G^ibid., XXXI, #11378, pp. 141-42.
G^Ibid., XXXI, #11380, pp. 145-48.

Kaiser's marginal
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comments, William II had difficulty containing himself.
Such a move would be regarded as casus belli, would be
answered with the original version of the Novelle, and
eventually with mobilization!

He instructed Bethmann to

send a telegram ordering the Ambassador to make representa
tions to that effect in London.

In addition, he repeated

his order for the immediate publication of the Novelle.
If the Chancellor did not publish it immediately, he would
have it published by army and navy authorities.
and that of the German people is at an end,"

"My patience

That evening,

William II personally sent a telegram to Mettemich order
ing him to make the representation he desired.
Such were the consequences of Bethmann's decision to
remain in office despite his lack of sympathy for the
Emperor's policy.

As a result of the Chancellor's repeated

circumventions of orders, the Emperor had finally taken
things into his own hands.
to resign.

Bethmann now had no choice but

The document justifying this step is of some

importance, for it brings out his dedication to the cause
of European peace and his sober insight into the German
diplomatic s i t u a t i o n . B e t h m a n n gives the impression of

G4ibid., X m ,

#11385, 11386, p..155.

G^Ibid., XXXI, #11387, p. 156.
^^Johannes Hohlfeld, ed., Bokumente der Deutschen Politik
und Geschichte von 1848 bis zur 6egenwart, (Berlin, 1951) il,'
pp. 251-53.
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a man consciously working against fate;

"Prom various

directives given by Your Majesty the last few days, I
have concluded that Your Majesty not only disapproves of
my conduct of foreign policy, but also mistrusts my actions."
He explained that the constitutional position of the
Chancellor did not permit the announcement of policy changes
by ministry secretaries without his approval.

But the

main point concerned the negotiations with Great Britain.
At the moment, these negotiations have taken an un
fortunate turn due to England's shifting of the basis
of negotiations. Despite this, it is in my humble
opinion our duty to carry on the negotiations if only
to prevent a sudden, crass disclosure of their failure,
or possibly to keep open the chances of renewed negotia
tions if not now, at least at some time in the future.
...If we do not do this, not only will our relations
with England be aggravated in a dangerous fashion, but
French chauvinism, which has already been rekindled,
will be encouraged to the highest hopes. Prance will
become so provocative that we will have to attack her.
In such a war. Prance will automatically have the
assistance of Russia, and no doubt that of England as
well, whereas for our allies, the casus foederis will
not arise....I cannot be responsible for creating such
a situation. If war is forced upon us, we will fight,
and with God’s help, win. But to unleash such a war
without our honour or vital interest being involved
would be a crime against Germany’s destiny, even if we
could look forward to complete victory. Even that is,
at least on the sea, not to be expected.
He explained the instructions he had sent to Mettemich—
to state in London that only the ship construction aspect of
the Novelle was under consideration in the present negotia
tions, but to emphasize German willingness to continue the
talks on a political agreement.

Into this situation,

William II had seen fit to interpose his own decision without
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Bethmann's consent.

He had thereby removed control of foreign

policy from him.
Your Majesty has evidently determined to conduct a
policy for which, for reasons just stated, I cannot
assume resposibility....On the strength of the office
I hold from Your Majesty, I am responsible before God,
country, history and my conscience, for the policy Your
Majesty orders. Hot even Your Majesty can remove this
responsibility from me.
For the events of the brief Oianoellor crisis, one must
depend heavily on the account of Admiral

T i r p i t z .

The

Emperor evidently collapsed under the pressure and conceded
rather more than was necessary— namely to leave open all
Novelle construction dates in order that these could be used
in the negotiations.

But now Tirpitz threatened to resign,

and William II retracted the concession.

The argument began

anew, this time with the particpation of the Empress, who
pleaded with the Chancellor to come to a decision (favourable,
of course) and no longer to retreat befq^ English pressure,
Bethmann could not have been unduly affected by the Lady’s
distress, for he made only the minimal concession of dropping
his categoric objection to the Novelle.

Meanwhile, he would

refrain from making announcements of its contents until all
hope of a settlement with England had disappeared.

He directs

ed Metternich to approach Haldane with this information.^®

6?Tirpitz, Aufbau, pp. 318-20. 323-25.
G. P .. XXXE, #11394, pp. 166-67. Haselmayr inter
prets this "mere postponement" as a victory for Tirpitz.
Haselmayr, Geschichte, VI, Part I, pp. 176-77. On this day,
the Emperor greeted Tirpitz with the words "we have won" so
he evidently considered that Bethmann had retreated. Neither
of these views seems justified.
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From the test of strength with Tirpitz, Bethmann emerged with
something close to a victory.

His strength, the Emperor

admitted uneasily, lay in the great trust placed in him by
69
foreign officials.
Under these circumstances, a more
aggressive nature, not satisfied with something only slight
ly better than a stalemate, might possibly have carried a
policy in complete opposition to the Grand Admiral.

But

Bethmann was not the man to seek total victories.
In consequence of his conviction that the Anglo-German
talks must continue, Bethmann sent off another proposal for
a political agreement, which he hoped might be favourably
considered in view of the postponement of the Hovelie publica70
tion.
After a certain amount of pressure from Ambassador
Metternich, the British cabinet announced exactly what it
was willing to give in. the way of political guarantees in
71
exchange for the complete scrapping of the Novelle.
This
formula, delivered on March 17, did indeed contain a clause
which could be interpreted as a neutrality promise.

In

Metternich's opinion, the phrase "nor join in any unprovoked
attack" implied a neutrality conditional upon Germany not
being in any sense the aggressor.

It was, of course, a very

weak neutrality undertaking, certainly not much better than

^^Tirpitz, Aufbau, p, 324.
7^0, G. P .. XXXI, #11395, pp. 167-69,
^Ifbid,, XXXI, #11399, 11400, 11403, pp. 178, 181-3.
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the old British offer not to become party to anything which
had an unprovoked attack as its object.

It was still very

far from the formula desired by Germany, which would guarantee
British neutrality in case Germany became involved in a war
on the continent against her own will.
Metternich further reported Grey stating that he con
sidered Bethmann responsible for the present sensible German
diplomacy and that, if he remained Chancellor, future AngloGerman friendship seemed likely.

Metternich's wording of

these alleged statements definitely implied a slight to the
Emperor, who fancied himself responsible for the continuity
of Germany policies.

72

He certainly interpreted the matter

as a slight. His outburst indicates that he may have found
Bethmann's famous integrity difficult to live with:
I have never before in my life heard of concluding
an agreement with and on account of a particular states
man. Prom the report, it is evident that Grey has no
idea who rules here, and that I am responsible. He
prescribes to me who shall be my minister if I wish to
conclude an agreement with England.
This mood may explain why the now obvious collapse of the
negotiations gave the Emperor a certain amount of pleasure.
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72ibid., XXXI, #11403, p. 183. Emperor's marginal notation.
Grey's report of these conversations differs substantially
in detail though not in spirit, from Metternich's report. Grey
makes no mention of the various pro-Bethmann statements which
Metternich attributes to him. He reports the Ambassador hintp
ing at the far-reaching consequences of a "change of personnel"
in Berlin. Possibly, Metternich deliberately sought to obtain
pro-Bethmann statements in order to strengthen the Chancellor's
hand. B. D. D ., VI, #539, p. 715.
^^Tirpitz, Aufbau. pp. 328-30.
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William II, wrote Tirpitz, noted with relief that Bethmann
had completely collapsed.

He had advised him to change the

basis of the negotiations completely, to make a public offer
of a complete offensive-defensive alliance with the inclusion
of Prance.

If Britain rejected this, she would be exposed as

the recalcitrant party,

"The agreement talks on Haldane’s

basis are dead."^^
The talks were indeed dead, although both parties went
through the motions for a few more weeks.

Bethmann chose to

ignore the Bnperor’s suggested new basis, and to make one
more try on the old b a s i s . But he displayed a great deal
of impatience at the last British offer, which he merciless
ly reduced to platitudes:

"Sir Edward Grey wishes to assure

us that England will not, in the future, attack us without
provocation;

we must conclude that, in the past, we had to

reckon with that possibility."
in this connection,

In his memoirs, he remarked

"...it was characteristic of the English

point of view as to peace and war that renunciation of unprovoded aggression should be considered an especial proof of
friendship."

All in all, his instruction to Mettemich on

March 18 was a rather brusque demand for some action on
England's part, and of course, this proved futile.
22, Bethmann could no longer procrastinate:

74ihid., p. 330.

On March

the publication

D. G. P.. XXXI, #11405, pp. 185-87.

75p. G. p.. XXXI, #11406, pp. 188-89.
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of the Novelle removed the last basis for discussion.
It was characteristic of Bethmann that he did not blame
Tirpitz and his followers for the breakdown of the talks;
nor did he doubt the integrity of the British statesmen.
He made this summary of the reason for this failures
I...incline to- the vlaw that we had to do. with an
honourable attempt to come to an understanding on the
part of England. It failed because England was not
Willing to follow out this understanding to its logical
consequences. An understanding with us meant that
France and Russia might lose the certainty that they
could continue to count on the support of England in
pursuing an anti-German policy. But that is just what
England would not do and just what England could not do
in view of its engagements.... That is the real reason
why the attempt at an understanding was wrecked. The
naval question was an important, but not a deciding
factor.
In all fairness, something must be added to make the
summary realistic.

A British dismantling of the existing

security system, (and this was at stake, despite all assurances
to the contrary) which was necessary to achieve Bethmann’s
plan, was unlikely and could not be expected so long as the
British mistrust of Germany continued.
served only to strengthen this mistrust.

The fleet increases
In this light, the

Novelle appears as the crucial factor in the failure.

Bethmann

realized this, for he remained implacably opposed to it.
1919» he could not yet bring himself to admit this.
Events in Germany connected with the Haldane mission

^^Bethmann Hollweg, Reflections, I, p. 57^

In
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represented an open clash between the two competing policies
toward Great Britain;
the Grand Admiral.

that of the Chancellor and that of

Their exchanges of resignation salvos

left the issue in doubt;
better of it.
victory.

perhaps Bethmann even had the

There is no doubt, however, who had the final

In May, 1913, the Admiral's arch-enemy, Ambassador

Metternich, was recalled from his London post.
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Once again,

Bethmann acquiesced in a decision he knew to be wrong.

G. P ., XXXI, #11427, pp. 231-32.

CHAPTER

IV

THE BALKAN WARS AND ANGLO-GERMAN RELATIONS
In his memoirs. Sir Edward Grey traced a sequence from
Austria's annexation of Bosnia to the Italian seizure of
Tripoli and to the Balkan Wars, creating the impression that
it was Austria's action which precipitated the real estate
shift which almost wiped out European Turkey.^

It is at

least equally valid to postulate France's Morocco entrench
ment as the key to Italy's seizure of Tripoli and as the first
event in the sequence.

At any rate, shortly after the out

break of war between Italy and Turkey, the Balkan states,
under the leadership of Russia, took steps to realize their
territorial ambitions at the expense of Turkey.

Russia

immediately revealed to her allies the contents of the
supposedly secret agreement, and even the Triple Alliance
soon had detailed information concerning this Balkan League.

2

It was evident that such an extension of Balkan Slav power,
under the leadership of Russia, must soon come in conflict
with Austria-Hungary, for this power with her numerous Slav
minority groups was generally regarded as the next target for
Balkan nationalism.
Diplomats both in England and Germany realized the

”*Grey, Twenty-Five Years, I, p. 260.
^D. G. P., XXXIII, #12058, pp. 23-26.

Editors' footnote.
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danger of an Austro-Russian confrontation in the Balkans,
and from this realization they derived similar conclusions.
Such a situation eventually produced, unofficially, the
kind of diplomatic accord which had been sought in vain
through deliberate stimulation.

For Bethmann's foreign

policy, these wars and the diplomatic reverberations origin
ating from them were of special importance;

they eventually

involved him in a choice between his diplomatic goal— friend
ship with England— and the unquestioned basis of all German
diplomacy— solidarity of the alliance with Austria.

Ironical

ly, Bethmann’s direct role in this development was compara
tively small, for Kiderlen-Waechter took charge of Germany's
foreign policy in the summer of 1912.
The stage was set for Anglo-German co-operation by the
disillusionment of both powers with their alliance partners.
In the German government, the Austrian Foreign Minister
Leopold Graf Berchtold had a poor reputation.

It is difficult

to avoid the conclusion that German officials did not really
comprehend Austria's Balkan dilemma.

When Berchtold pro

posed collective Great-Power warnings in Constantinople and
in Balkan capitals, Kiderlen characterized this merely as
an attempt on Berchtold's part to confound domestic critics,
who had often pointed out his lack of initiative.

The

Chancellor added that this was his impression as well.

^Ibid., XXXIII, #12087, pp. 49-51.
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When Berchtold eventually withdrew his proposal because of
negative reaction in Constantinople, Kiderlen informed
4
Bethmann of this with gleeful sarcasm.
More serious, in Kiderlen's eyes, was the fact that
Berchtold had neglected to consult with Germany prior to
making his proposals.

Since Chancellor Bethmann was to

visit Berchtold in Buchlau on September 7 and 8, Kiderlen
asked him to bring the matter to his host’s attention.

5

In view of the united stand of the Entente powers, Germany
could not well follow a policy divergent from that of Austria,
For this reason, it was particularly important that Austria
consult Germany before taking action.

"I would consider it

useful," wrote Kiderlen, "if you Excellency could bring this
standpoint out in a firm but friendly manner.

We are not

inclined to play the Austrian satellite in the Orient."
While German diplomats realized the importance of the Austrian
alliance, this made them even more impatient with what they
considered Austrian blunders.
the distrust of his ally.

Berchtold fully reciprocated

At the Buchlau meeting, he was

not impressed by the Chancellor's grasp of foreign policy

4lbid., m i l l ,

#12153, pp. 89-91.

5lbid., XXXIII, #12135, pp. 92-94. Ho doubt, the German
Foreign Office was inclined to worry about Austria’s tendency
to take precipitous action without consulting her ally ever
since she had plunged into the annexation of Bosnia (1908)
without giving adequate warning to Germany.
(See B. G. P .,
XXVI)
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details;

.

the latter seemed to agree with Berchtold's summary

of Austrian policy mainly because he had neither the firm
conviction nor the base of knowledge to disagree.^
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei 0. Sazonov's visit to
Great Britain revealed a similar atmosphere of distrust be
tween Great Britain and Russia.

Sir Arthur Nicolson re

ported great disappointment in Russia over Great Britain's
7
apparent lack of sympathy for Russia's Balkan policy.
The Russian government's official communique produced negative
press assessments of the value of the Entente for Russia.
The press felt that England's position as a major "Musselman"
power prevented her from appreciating Russia's obligations
as the major Slav power.

Nicolson feared for the life of

the Entente.
To the pressing Balkan problems, the British and German
foreign offices offered similar solutions, a fact which did
much to further diplomatic co-operation.

Sir Edward Grey

closed a dispatch to the British Ambassador in Austria with
the following guidelines

"We must do all we can to keep

Austria and Russia co-operating together in Balkan affairs.
It is the only way to prevent them from falling out."® On

^6. U. A .,

VI, #3771, pp. 415-16.

?B. D. P .,

IX, #76364, 769-70, 808, 811, pp. 722-30.

®Ibid., IX, #769, pp. 729-30.
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September 7, Kiderlen suggested to the French Ambassador
that Russia and Austria together should take the initiative
in Balkan matters.

He undertook to use his influence in

Vienna to that end, on the assumption that France would act
9
similarly in St. Petersburg.
This Anglo-German community of interest and the rapid
deterioration of the Balkan peace led Sir Edward Grey to
approach the German Changé d'Affaires, Richard von Kuehlmann, with an offer to keep the respective foreign offices
in close touch during the crisis.

10

Grey’s private secre

tary, Sir William Tyrrel, continued the conversations,
explaining that Grey was extremely tired of the long AngloGerman feud, and heartily desired to bring it to an end.
The present situation seemed an ideal opportunity to estab
lish relations which might expand to all areas of conflict
between the two nations.

Kuehlmann, like Nicolson, saw in

the Anglo-Russian disenchantment a possibility for the
rupture of the Entente, and he promptly informed Bethmann
of his discovery.

His report was a very optimistic one.

Earlier in his Chancellorship, Bethmann might have
greeted such a report with enthusiasm, for the breakup of

^D. G. P ., XXXIII, #12189, pp. 139-40 and editors’
footnote.
"'^Balkan events October 14, peace between Turkey and
Italy. October 17, Balkan wars break out. Grey's offer,
Ibid., XXXIII, #12284, pp. 238-42.
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the Entente was the highest objective of his foreign policy.
Now, he took scant notice.

Kiderlen sent Kuehlmann a cautious

ly positive reply, agreeing to the suggested co-operation,
but questioning the validity of Sir Edward Grey's "change
11
of heart."
Why had he so carefully emphasized the personal
and non-official nature of the conversations?
Please be sure to tell Sir Edward Grey that, though
we are, as he can see, quite ready to go hand in hand
with England, we must place two conditions on our accep
tance. One, that the talks shall be absolutely secret,
and in particular, shall not be given away by discreet
hints....The other, that in case an agreement be achieved,
it shall not be treated as a pudendum, but openly repre
sented with the other powers....We are prepared to enter
on this action only if we are certain that England will
not merely use it to her own personal end and then sacri
fice it to other relations.
Bethmann annotated this cynical document with one word:
"Agreed."

Evidently, he shared fully his Foreign Secretary's

suspicions of British motives.
Before the opening of Balkan hostilities, the Great
Powers had unanimously and hypocritically decided that the
territorial status quo must not be altered by the war.

12

The course of the war made short work of the resolution;

l^lbid., x m i l , #12287, pp. 233-37.
12

Since they were without exception aware of the exis
tence and aims of the Balkan League and of Russia's leader
ship thereof, they could not well have contemplated military
action to prevent territorial aggrandisement of the Balkan
powers at the expense of Turkey. Obviously, the declara
tion was merely to prevent territorial expansion of Turkey,
should she prove victorious.
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Turkish forces suffered severe defeats on all fronts and
fell back almost to Constantinople.

Negotiations of the

powers therefore began on the basis of some territorial
adjustment.
On October 28, Sir Edward Grey assured Kuehlmann that
the Anglo-German co-operation, over which he expressed great
pleasure, should continue through these dangerous develop
ments.

It would be particularly useful, he said, for the
13
two countries to support joint Austro-Russian action,

Russia and France, on the other hand, came up with a pro
posal on behalf of the Entente ;

that the Great Powers

offer their mediation on the basis of their complete terri14
torial disinterest.
This represented a contradiction
of Grey’s desire to de-emphasize alliance groups, and he
15
was understandably annoyed with his alliance partners.
Germany and Austria saw the proposal as a trap for Austria,
for that nation could not by any stretch of the imagination
consider herself territorially disinterested.
Ear from expressing disinterest, Austria was firmly
determined to prevent a Serbian extension to the Adriatic
Sea.

To this end, Austria advocated the creation of a new

T^ibid., XXXIII, #12305, pp. 259-60.
14.
I^ibid., XXXIII, #12307, pp. 261-70.
15
Ibid., XXXIII, #12346, pp. 300-1

!
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State, Albania, between Serbia and the Adriatic coast.
Though he encountered opposition from a vacillating Emperor,
Bethmann succeeded in placing German diplomacy firmly behind
this Austrian plan.^^

As usual, the Emperor issued frequent

and contradictory directives, which his diplomats did not
act on.

Finally, he ordered a policy of firm support of

Austria along the lines advocated by his Chancellor.

17

This

policy was then implemented.
In November, the question of a Serbian port put the
German diplomats through a tight-rope act, the object of
which was to continue co-operation with England, while at
the same time firmly supporting Austria.

Grey and Bethmann

began by clarifying Austria's official position, which did
not exclude fair Serbian territorial compensation elsewhere,
but which precluded at the outset any possibility of a port.
Russia, on the other hand, supported Serbia's claim to part
of the Adriatic coast.

The new German Ambassador in London,

Prince Karl Max von Lichnowsky, adhered fully to his instruc
tions and gave no hope that German influence could be used
to bring about an Austrian retreat.^

At this point. Sir

Edward Grey suggested a Great-Power mediation which would

l^lbid.,

XXXIII, #12346, pp, 300-1.

I^Ibid.,

XXXIII, #12349, 12405, pp. 302-4,

I^ibid.,

XXXIII, #12399, pp. 363-64.

373-74.
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treat the port question as part of the general settlement
and would avoid an Austro-Russian confrontation on the
issue.

In this manner, both Austria and Russia managed

an honourable disengagement.
When British and German diplomats realized how far
co-operation between the two countries had gone, a curious
reaction set in.

They seemed to search for a new diplomatic

balance, a new set of stable relationships.

In the process,

they delimited to each other exactly how far they would go
in the de-emphasis of existing alliances.

On November 25,

Kiderlen released a press statement which so strongly em
phasized the collective role of the European concert that
it was interpreted as a check to A u s t r i a . T o dispel
the notion that Austria and Germany were in disagreement,
Bethmann declared in the Reichstag:
Should there be— which we do not hope— insoluble
differences, (when it comes to settling the affairs in
the Near East) it will be a matter for those powers which
are directly interested in that specific case to see that
their interests are recognized. That holds also for our
allies. If, however, in making good their interests they
are unexpectedly attacked by a third party, and their
existence is threatened, then we would, true to our al
liance obligations, have to step resolutely to the side
of our ally.

I^Helmreich is of the opinion that Bethmann intended
the article to correct an erroneous impression given by the
Emperor's exuberant statements to Francis Ferdinand on the
occasion of the letter's visit to Germany. Ernst Christian
Helmreich, The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars 1912-15.
(Cam
bridge, Mass’.”,' T93Ô T p. 244.
20
Ibid., p. 245.
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Clearly, Bethmann thought it inadvisable to leave any doubt
concerning the strength of the Dual Alliance, even at the
risk of endangering the promising Anglo-German co-operation.
He displayed here for the first time the fateful tendency
to over-compensate whenever the solidarity of the Dual
Alliance was questioned.

A rapprochement with England was

no doubt still his goal, but he was not disposed to pursue
it in a crisis at the risk of jeopardizing long-standing
friendships.

Sir Edward Grey was indeed somewhat taken

aback by the Chancellor's speech, but he also placed limits
on the flexibility of his foreign policy.

21

On two occasions

he gave lichnowsky to understand that Germany could not count
on British neutrality if a war developed (regardless, how)
between Austria and Russia, and Germany joined her ally.
These mutual limitations seemed not to produce any resent
ment,

On the contrary, they provided added incentive for

a peaceful solution to the real estate squabbles.
On December 4, an armistice ended Balkan hostilities;
the former belligerents met in London to discuss peace terms.
At the same time, the resident Ambassadors of the Great
Powers met in conference to adjust the claims of their
protégés without involving Europe in a war.

The Triple

Alliance entered the conference with demonstratively united

^^D. G. P .,

xmil,

#12447, 12481, pp. 417-20, 451-53,
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front, for on December 5, their alliance agreements had been
renewed long ahead of schedule.

In addition, Austria show

ed her determination by the re-appointment of the aotiviët
Chief of the General Staff, Count Franz Conrad von Hoetzendorf.

Despite this stage setting of unity, Bethmann issued

instructions to avoid procedures which might emphasize the
22
bi-polarity of the Powers,
Proposals were not to be made
on behalf of individual nations,

lichnowsky was, however,

to support generally the position of his allies, particular
ly that of Austria.

The German desire to avoid undue em-

pyasis on alliances coincided completely with Sir Edward
Grey's policy.
In the four days from December 17 to 21, the Conference
dealt effectively with the most dangerous question— the
23
matter of a Serbian port.
The solution was favourable
to the Triple Alliance, particularly to Austria:

Albania

was to extend from Montenegro to Greece along the Adriatic
Sea, and Serbia was to be compensated with a railway outlet
to a neutral Albanian port.

The problem of the location of

the fortress of Scutari, however, proved more difficult of
solution.

On Kiderlen's advice, the conference adopted a

dilatory procedure to avoid a showdown before the Christmas

22lbid., XXXIV, #12540, pp. 44-6.
^^Ibid.. XXXIV, #12545, 12557, pp. 55-4, 65-4.
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recess.
Four days were sufficient to reveal the position of the
new German Ambassador;

despite his instructions, lichnowsky

displayed great sympathy for the positions of Great Britain
and Russia.

He was particularly impressed by Grey's chair

manship of the conference, which he described as flawlessly
neutral.

He claimed to detect a pronounced loosening of

Entente bonds;

Sir Edward Grey, who had to this point support

ed the position of the Triple Alliance, now had every right
to expect Germany to bring Austria around on the Scutari
matter— to let this fortress go to Montenegro instead of to
Albania as Austria desired.
Bethmann and the German diplomats were still on their
guard; they shared neither Lichnowsky's enthusiasm for Grey
nor his estimate of the Entente 's troubles.

In their view,

the quid pro quo suggested by Lichnowsky was not required.
Russia had gained substantially through the great success of
her Balkan allies, a success which would have been impossible
without Austria’s great

forbearance.

The latter now had

the right to safeguard her interests in view of the growth
of Slav power on her borders.

Kiderlen feared that Lichnow25
sky was "being taken" by Sir Edward Grey.
He was probably

^^Ibid., XXXIV, #12557, 12558, 12561, 12562, pp. 65-74.
In his opinion that the Entente bonds were loosening, Lichnoysky was vigorously supported by the enthusiastic Kuehlmann.
^^Ibid., XXXIV, #12557, pp. 65-4.

Kiderlen's annotations.
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right.

Judging from the words of the Russian Ambassador

Count Paul Benckendorff, Russia was quite satisfied with
Sir Edward Grey's attitude:

"England does not wish war,

therefore she works toward compromise, which will assure a
Russian success, consequently a success of the Triple
Entente.
To this point, Kiderlen, the acknowledged Balkan expert,
had directed foreign policy almost singlehandedly;
occasional approvals from Bethmann are in evidence.

only
Kider

len's death on December 30 forced Bethmann to take once more
an active part in the conduct of diplomacy.

His first task

was to issue instructions for the renewal of the Ambassadors'
conference.

He told lichnowsky specifically to co-operate

with British diplomats in order to avert a renewal of hos
tilities in the B a l k a n s . O n January 4, 1913, Grey pro
posed a Great-Power demarche in Constantinople, which Beth
mann agreed to support.

He refused support for a French

proposal of an accompanying naval demonstration, partly
because he knew Sir Edward Grey to be in opposition to such
28
a step.
While he was thus tenderly concerned with AngloGerman co-operation, he did not fail to support Austria;

ZGjbid., XXXIV, #12561, pp. 70-73. Stieve, Per Diplomatische Schriftwechsel Iswolskys 1911-14. (Berlin, 1924)
III, p. 58.
27p. G. P ., XXXIV, #12592, pp. 102-3.
Z^ibid., XXXIV, #12616, pp. 129-31.
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when the Russian Ambassador in Berlin complained of Austrian
intransigence, he answered with a sharp refusal to put pres29
sure on his ally.
He advised Russia to approach Austria
directly and to seek a solution by mutual compromise.
As the Conference took up the task of adjusting Albania’s
borders, there was more difficulty with Lichnowsky, who
persistently advocated German pressure to reduce Austria’s
d e m a n d s . T h e same request came from Grey through his
Ambassador in Berlin, but Bethmann held fast to his deter
mination not to pressure Austria.

In answer to Grey, he

suggested British pressure on Russia i n s t e a d . M e a n w h i l e ,
lichnowsky supported his Alliance partners only with illconcealed reluctance.

He reported Russian Ambassador Bencken

dorff declaring that Russian could no longer yield in the
matter of Albania.

Lichnowsky was sure this was no bluff;

he was thoroughly alarmed.

"If we neglect to tell Austria

that we do not desire war over Albania and Serbia, war will
come."

On receipt of this somewhat hysterical plea, Beth

mann decided that it was time for a thorough reorientation
of his Ambassador, but this proved to be a difficult process.

29lbid., XXXIV, #12635, p. 149.
3^Ibid., XXXIV, #12696, pp. 210-11.
51lbid., XXXIV, #12705, p. 223.
^^Ibid., XXXIV,##12708, 12748, 12763, pp. 227-28, 270,
281-83, steps in this process of reorientation.
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On January 20, the Chancellor replied to Lichnowsky's warn
ing that he might have reminded the Russian Ambassador of
Austria’s vital interest in the shaping of Balkan affairs;
Russia’s interest, on the other hand, was merely a sentimen
tal one.

Moreover, Austria had accepted Serbian occupation

of the Sandjak of Novi Bazar, a very significant concession
which Benckendorff had evidently forgotten.

"Our policy,’’

he concluded,
...will support Austria's wishes insofar as necessary
to maintain our ally’s Great-Power position. If it
thereby comes in opposition to Russia, it is because
Russian policy aims at a reduction of that Great-Power
position. I beg your Excellency to keep these points
in mind during the coming negotiations.
Such a lecture from Kiderlen would probably have terminated
the discussion.
the point again.

With Bethmann, Lichnowsky chose to make
He could not judge, he said, whether

Russia’s Balkan interests were indeed only sentimental;
nor could he ignore the fact that public opinion could be
as easily aroused by sentimental as by rational consideration—
vide the Hohenzollem candidature to the Spanish throne.
As for Austria, he feared that influential circles in Vienna
were resigned to the inevitability of a war to solve the
South Slav dilemma.

They could only entertain such hopes

with full expectation of German support,

Huch unconditional

support must therefore be denied them.
Once more the Chancellor rejected the viewpoint, this
time with the patient irony of a kindly professor.

He did
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not mind controversial viewpoints on foreign policy, par
ticularly when expounded with lichnowsky's skillful histori
cal and political excursions, but in the performance of his
duties, the Ambassador must set aside his personal feelings
in favour of energetic pursuit of the policy laid down by
the Chancellor,

l'or the present, "...our task is clear;

Solution of the Scurari question through compromise and
co-operation with Great Britain, but without undermining
our relations with Austria."

Like Lichnowsky, he desired

closer co-operation with Great Britain, but
...our present co-operation with England, which cannot
be nurtured too carefully, is not based on sentimental
considerations, nor solely on mutual desire for peace.
The English are accustomed to sober calculations and
noting the united action of the Triple Alliance, they
endeavour to keep their existing connections intact.
We must do the same, or expose ourselves to the danger
that an England whose ties to us are still rather weak
will, under pressure from Russia and Prance, abandon us.
That would have the most disastrous consequences.
There is further evidence of Bethmann’s continuing mis
trust of Great Britain.

Prom time to time, rumors arose that

the Entente powers had an agreement on the diposition of
territory in Asia Minor in expectation of a Turkish collapse,
Germany had important interests in the area, and could not
stand by idly in such an event.

When questioned in the

Reichstag, Bethmann gave reassuring answers, but privately
he felt useasy over the matter.

CM January 25, a renewal

55p. G. P .. XXXIV, #12710, pp. 229-30, and editors'
footnote.
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of Balkan hostilities seemed imminent, and with this, the
possibility of a Turkish collapse reappeared.

The Chancellor

indicated his doubts in a m e m o r a n d u m . G e r m a n y must not
be faced with the fait accompli of an Entente agreement for
spheres of interest which would in time turn into protector
ates.

He did not care to have a repetition of Morocco.

Germany must indicate to Great Britain that a liquidation
of Asia Minor could not take place without her full parti
cipation;

he instructed Lichnowsky to approach Sir Edward

Grey with this information.
In London, the Ambassadors' conference began to seek a
solution to the Serbo-Albanian border problem.

Since Austria

and Russia had adopted completely intransigent attitudes,
the question could not safely be taken up in the Conference
without preliminary work behind the scenes;

otherwise, it

might become a matter of national honour for each country.
Consequently, Germany and Great Britain acted behind the
scenes to arrange compromises in advance in every situation
that threatened a showdown.

When concessions were not

forthcoming, the two go-betweens procrastinated until some
room for negotiation appeared.

55

continued to complain bitterly.

Meanwhile, Lichnowsky
The Foreign Office, he

^^Ibid.. XXXIV, #12557, pp. 255-56.
55

For a description of the modus operandi, see Grey,
Twenty-Five Years, I, pp. 266-69.
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said, was asking him to be "more Austrian than the Austrian
Ambassador," and to defend so-called Austrian "concessions"
which were not concessions at all.^^
On February 12, Grey admitted privately to lichnowsky
that Scutari was strategically an Albanian city.

In the

language of that complicated diplomacy, this meant that
Russia would concede the same point in the Conference.

This

left practically only one town in dispute, a place of 6000
inhabitants called Djak>va.

In a perfect illustration of

the possibilities of the "old diplomacy", the Great Powers
of hurope were locked in a struggle over an obscure Balkan
town of which the vast majority of Europeans had never heard.
Grey and Lichnowsky confronted each other with the embarras
singly small "concessions" they had to bargain with.

The

differences in question became smaller each time, but would
not disappear.

Religious and economic concessions were of

fered, but the town itself remained the desired object of
both parties.
At this point, Bethmann decided to apply some slight
pressure to Austria.

Russia, he said, found it extremely

difficult to retreat gracefully in the face of Austrian

56%. G. P ., XXXIV, #12794, 12817, 12826, pp. 320,
345-46 ,"355-56 .
57lbid., XXXIV, #12838, p. 366.
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intransigence.

38

The Chancellor touched the dangerous topic:

British friendship, which Germany was not seeking only for
a selfish purpose, should on no account be jeopardized by
unreasonable resistance to compromise.

It was only a gentle

hint, but it represented a turning point in the Chancellor's
attitude toward Austria.
Eventually, Russia and Austria prepared the way for a
solution by direct negotiations, as Germany and Great Britain
had often advised.

As a result of Prince Hohenlohe's mission

to St. Petersburg, the two Balkan rivals affected an easing
of military tension by agreeing to a demobilization of border
30
forces which had long remained on the a l e r t . ^ In this more
relaxed atmosphere, concessions came easier.

On March 4,

Grey offered full Russian support for other Conference de
cisions if Austria would concede Djakova to Serbia.

The

likelihood that force would be needed to evict the Montene
grins from Albania's Scutari convinced Berchtold to accept
this offer, but not before Bethmann applied one more touch
of German p r e s s u r e . T h i s represented virtually a solution
of the Serbo-Albanian border issue.

The London Conference

of Ambassadors quickly produced an official decision, and

38lbid., ZXXIV, #12818, p. 346.
39lbid., AXnv, #12692, 12891, pp. 414-15.
purpose and results of the Hohenlohe mission.
40lbid., XXXIV, # 13002, pp. 538-39.

On the
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on April 15, 1913, the Great Powers acquainted the Balkan
states with the future Serbo-_*lbanian border.
There is an interesting sequel to the Scutari question,
which again shows Great Britain and Germany in full diplo
matic accord.

King Nikita of Montenegro, unimpressed by the

Great-Power decision, continued the siege of Scutari in con
junction with Serbian detachments.

The Great Powers decided

to put pressure on Montenegro, but Russia proved unwilling to
take action against a Slav

p o w e r .

42

in consequence of this

delay, Austria prepared to take independent action against
Montenegro and Serbia.
To Russia's surprise. Great Britain decided to partici
pate vigorously in proceedings to oust the Montenegrins,
an action which was applauded in German diplomatic circles.
The Conference of Ambassadors, prompted by Grey and Lichnow
sky, proposed a collective naval demonstration.

It was a

foregone conclusion that Russia would not actively partici
pate, but when Prance also seemed to hesitate. Sir Edward
Grey expressed the idea that Austria and Italy alone should
be empowered to use force.

Shortly thereafter, Prance an

nounced her full participation, a development which in Germany

4^B. L. D ., IX, # 4 7 , p. 386.
G. P ., XXXIV, #13029, 13035, pp. 564-65, 569.

45lbid., XXXIV, #13038, pp. 571.
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was credited to Grey's influence.
King Nikita was not more impressed by the naval demon
stration and by the demands of its British Admiral than he
had been by the decision of the Great Powers.

He charged

the Powers with a breach of neutrality in his war with
Turkey, and continued the siege.

Emperor William II did

not share his royal colleague's strong nerves and he began
to doubt, after all this time, the feasibility of establish
ing an independent illbania.

It was all Bethmann could do

to prevent him from collapsing under pressure from the King
of M o n t e n e g r o T h e arguments Bethmann used to convince
William II show the former completely confident of continued
co-operation with Great Britain.

There was no cause for

despair over the question of nlbania, he said.

The key to

the issue was England's attitude, and since that country
strongly favoured the establishment of Albania, Germany
could co-operate with her while at the same time safeguard
ing the interests of her Austrian ally.

For Austria, he

continued, the matter was absolutely vital î
The Albanian buffer state is the only positive result
which the Danubien Monarchy can save out of the ship
wreck of her Balkan aspirations. Should even this modest
gain elude her at the last moment, her foreign policy
would be faced with a bankruptcy which would endanger
her international power status as well as her national

44lbid., XXXIV, #13081, p. 614.
45lbid., XXXIV, #13108, pp. 640-42.
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cohesion. To prevent such a development, which would
be a loss not only for Austria but also for her allies,
is the most important task of our diplomacy at the moment.
Bethmann's faith in Sir Edward Grey's fortitude was
not misplaced.

Though Montenegrin troops finally captured

Scutari, they were not permitted to remain long in that city.
Grey announced publicly that, failing a withdrawal of Mon
tenegrin troops, "any interested power" could reasonably be
expected to take independent a c t i o n . ( I n this case,
"interested power" meant "Austria".)

Though this further

aggravated the difference between Britain and Russia, it
finally brought King Nikita to his senses.

He preferred

"voluntary" withdrawal to expulsion by the Austrian army.
On May 4, he surrendered Scutari to a landing party from
the demonstrating naval vessels.
There is little doubt that Sir Edward Grey and Bethmann
Hollweg were responsible for the preservation of peace in
Europe.

The former had prevented Russia from stiffening

the resistance of Serbia and Montenegro in the face of
justified Austrian demands.

The latter had prevented pre

mature Austrian action which would have forced Grey's hand.
In this manner, Bethmann preserved for Austria that minimum
of victory which prevented her collapse in the Balkans.
With one or two exceptions, Bethmann was able to combine
co-operation with England and scrupulous concern for the

4&B. D. P ., IX, #876, 886, 887, 892, 894, 899, pp. 404428.
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welfare of Austria.
After the World War, Bethmann declared that the soli
darity of the Dual Alliance had at all time been his pri
mary c o n c e r n . T o this point in the Balkan Wars, this is
largely true, but during the course of the war between
Bulgaria and her former allies, he seems to have departed
significantly from this rule.

In fact, Austro-German dif

ferences developed with the first hint of war.

Bate in

June, Berchtold requested German diplomatic pressure on
Rumania.^®

That country's territorial demands on Bulgaria

were, in his opinion, playing into Russia's hand, and he
asked Germany to make this point in Bucharest.

The German

Foreign Office, however, declined on the grounds that the
onus for conciliation was on Bulgaria, since Rumania's
demands were quite justified.

Hostilities between Serbia

and Bulgaria began a few days later, and Rumania mobilized
her forces on the Bulgarian frontier to add greater emphasis
to her territorial demands.

How Berchtold warned Germany

that Austria did not intend to see Bulgaria decisively de
feated by the Serbs and their allies,

Serbia was the "Pied

mont" of the Balkans, and any strengthening of Serbia was
a mortal danger to the Dual Monarchy.

Bethmann Hollweg, Reflections, I , pp. 78-9.
G. P .. %%XV, #13428, pp. 66-70.

Anlage,
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This prompted Bethmann to intercede

p e r s o n a l l y . ^9

It

was, in his opinion, definitely Bulgaria’s turn to show
evidence of a conciliatory spirit.

On no condition should

Rumania be alienated from the Alliance by unfair pressure;
she would be driven straight into Russia's arms.

Moreover,

a Serbo-Bulgarian conflict must be favourable to Austria,
for regardless of the outcome, both nations would be weakened
and dependent upon Austria's goodwill for many years.

Even

with a complete Serbian victory, "the fat will not be in
the fire."

On the other hand, he explained, an Austrian

attempt to deprive Serbia of the fruits of victory would
lead to a European war if attempted by force.
I can only hope, therefore, that Vienna will not
be disquieted by the chimera of a Greater Serbia, but
will await the decisions of the theater of war. I must
advise strongly against any attempt to swallow Serbia,
which could only weaken the Monarchy.
It was a noble attempt to keep Austria on a peaceful
course, but an attempt based on faulty reasoning!

The notion

that the war would weaken Serbia and make her dependent on
Austria's goodwill was soon refuted by events,

Berchtold's

"Piedmont" analogy proved to be tragically correct.
In contrast to Bethmann's troubles with Austria, his
relations with Great Britain showed continued improvement.
Sir Edward Grey chose this moment to answer the Chancellor's

49 Ibid.. XXXV, #13491, pp. 130-51.
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query concerning Asia Minor.

German interests there would,

he assured him, receive full consideration in the event of
50
a Turkish collapse.
Grey also made it his business to
let the Chancellor know that he disapproved of Austria’s
attitude in the present crises.

51

A similar situation

existed in the Ambassadors' Conference which, during the
summer was discussing the Greek-Albanian border.

Again,

Grey found occasion to complain about a lack of co-operation
from Austria, and lichnowsky naturally forwarded these com
plaints to Bethmann.

One can imagine that he reported them

with great personal satisfaction.
It was the Bucharest peace conference which revealed
the seriousness of Austro-German differences.

Here, the

Emperor emerged once more as an important factor in the
conduct of German diplomacy.
signment

The key question was the as

of Zavala, a town which Austria claimed for Bul

garia, whereas Germany, partly for dynastic reasons, favoured its assignment to Greece,
herself

52

For once, Germany found

in agreement with France, a situation which brought

applause from England.

Equally unique was the fact that

^^Ibid., XXXV, #13436, pp. 75-77. Such a collapse was,
however, no longer an immediate possibility,
^^Ibid., XXXV, #13481, p. 121.
52
The Greek king, Constantine I was the German Emperor’s
brother-in-law.
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Russia supported the Austrian p o s i t i o n . T h e German Foreign
Office instructed its Ambassador in Austria to make the
German position more palatable to Austria by pointing out
the desirability of securing Greece as an adherent to the
Triple Alliance.
The argument failed to impress Berchtold.

He made one

last attempt to convince his ally of the folly of supporting Greece,

55

The key to all Balkan possibilities, he ex

plained, was Serbia,

Given Serbia’s undoubted and (in the

foreseeable future) irreconcilable animosity, Bulgaria was
the logical counter weight.

A reconciliation between Bul

garia and Rumania could be achieved with Germany's support;
that was the most useful and the most practical Balkan
alignment.

Greek friendship, while in itself desirable,

could not be depended on because of that country's involve
ments with Serbia.

Moreover, in the event of a war with

Russia and her allies, Greece would be of little use to
the Triple Alliance.
The lecture was to no avail.

On August 7» the peace

conference at Bucharest resolved the border question in

5^0f course, the important matter for each country
was the future alignment of Greece or Bulgaria, the cross
alliance support being only a by-product of the jockeying
for new allies.
G. p ., XXXV, #13724, p. 364.
55lbid., XXXV, #13741, pp. 365-67
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favour of Greece.

The German Foreign Office strongly advised

Austria not to exercise her right of revision with regard
56
to Kavala,
Indeed, if Ambassador Heinrich von Tschirschky
followed his instructions, Austrian diplomats must have
known that they would, in such an event, stand completely
alone.
/my chance of a misunderstanding disappeared with another
ham-handed interference by the Emperor,

On August 7, King

Charles of Rumania wired William II, saying in part, "After
important difficulties have been surmounted, the conclusion
of peace is assured and, thanks to you, remains certain..,"57
The Emperor expressed "great satisfaction,"

King Charles

thanked him with "pride and genuine gratitude."

When William

II decided on immediate publication of the telegrams, Beth
mann sought to dissuade him from this step;

while he approved

this direction in diplomacy, he had no desire to make public
the Austro-German differences, or to give further offence
to the Dual Monarchy.
tions.^

But the Emperor overrode his objec-

As Bethmann had anticipated, the Austrian press

gave dramatic emphasis to the divergence.

5^Ibid.,

XXXV, #13741, pp. 365-67.

57lbid.,

XXXV, #13741, pp. 365-67.

58ibid.,

XXXV, #13736, pp. 368-69.

The Neue Freie
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Presse of Vienna phrased it thus:

"For the first time in

this long crisis, the German Empire is not on our side, and
not in favour of our

p o l i c y .

"^9

Now, Bethmann found little solace in improved AngloGerman relations.

For the first time in his career as

Chancellor he had permitted the erosion of what was for him
the one unquestionable commandment of German diplomacy:
the solidarity of the Dual Alliance I

What could be more

natural than that he should attempt to repair this breach
during the next Balkan crisis?

59lbid., X33V, #15749, p. 572. Editors' footnote.
"Heue Freie Presse," 11 August 1913.

CONCLUSION

It is a relatively simple matter to pinpoint crucial
instances at which a different decision by Bethmann Hollweg
might have reversed the drift toward catastrophe:

had he

gone slower in his initial approach to England, had he not
insisted on a formally-negotiated and duly signed reconcili
ation, he might have established some sort of ^nglo-German
bond.

Such a bond might even have developed naturally had

he refused permission for the dispatch of a gunboat to
Agadir.

In 1912, had he pressed for a complete victory

over Tirpitz before withdrawing his resignation, he might
have established the superiority of civilian policy over
the alleged needs of the military.

However, the task of a

student b.f history is not to re-play the diplomatic game,
but to understand the reasons for the decisions which were
made.
In his attempt to alter Great Britain's position in
the alliance structure, Bethmann operated within very narrow
bounds.

The chief motivation for his efforts was

a feeling

of insecurity derived from the knowledge that Germany's
alliance was weakening, both strategically and structurally
relative to that of her rivals.

However, any re-alignment

had to be achieved without a preliminary dissolution of
existing bonds, for the alliances were important not only
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in the event of war, hut in everyday diplomatic relations.
Thus, a weakening of one alliance would have an immediate
and increasingly weakening effect on the world positions of
countries within that alliance.

This explains Bethmann's

tedious insistence on official negotiations, on immediate
tangible proof of friendship.

Certainly, he could not risk

alienating an alliance partner on the mere chance of secur
ing a different alignment of powers.
Moreover, Bethmann directed only one of two German
foreign policies, and was thus constrained to produce visible
results to retain support for his policy.

It is ironic that

the other policy, directed by Navy Secretary Tirpitz, had the
same goal of producing a change in Great Britain's status,
though it used an approach completely in contradiction to
that of the Chancellor.

While Bethmann sought this objective

by means of reconciliation and settlement of differences,
Tirpitz used the pressure of armaments in an attempt to
force a change of position of Great Britain, a procedure
we know today as a "cold war."

Both policies climaxed in

the Haldane visit, and both failed, partly because they
cancelled each other.
Following the Haldane mission, Germany really had no
policy toward Great Britain, other than an implicit return
to reliance on the existing alignment.

Bethmann had given

up the hope of bringing Germany and Great Britain together,
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and he remained stubbornly suspicious of British motives
throughout the Balkan Wars.

Only in the summer of 1913

did he begin to accept the Anglo-German co-operation which
had come about despite his disillusionment.
In August 1 9 1 3 , when Austria claimed that Germany had
deserted her, the startled Chancellor found himself drifting
away from his firmest ally, but still a long way from Englandin other words, at sea.
for security.

His natural reaction was to grasp

In July 1914, he still feared for the solidar-1

ity of his one useful alliance.
Austrian move in the Balkans :
we pushed them into it ;
have deserted them.

"Our old dilemma in every
if we encourage them, they say

if we discourage them, they say we

Then they approach the Western Powers,

who are waiting with open arms."

Germany, the Chancellor

thought, could not afford to further alienate her ally;

his

support of Austria in 1914 was immediate and unconditional.
The Chancellor could have prevented the war in July
of 1 9 1 4 , had he been willing to risk a deterioration of his
country's "Great-Power" status.
to do;

This he was not prepared

probably he did not even consider it as a real al

ternative.

Thus, he could easily convince himself that he

had now no choice but to support his ally.

Precisely the

1
6 July 1 9 1 4 , reported by Bethmann's private secretary
Riezler, in Karl Dietrich Erdmann, "Eur Beurteilung Bethmann
Hollwegs," Geschichte in Wissenschaft und ünterricht (Sept,
1964) 529 - 40 :
'
'
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same can be said of all the chief executives of the other
"Great Powers" of Europe,

Their refusal to risk diplomatic

status even in view of the well-known and immense dangers
involved can be partly explained by their attitude towards
wr,r in general.

While they all feared and condemned it,

they still retained some feeling of "war idealism," a feel
ing that, despite its horrors, war brought out the supreme
virtues of self-sacrifice and national unity.

Among the

statesmen of Europe, there was not one who would make signifi
cant sacrifices to save the peace.
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